

## New Politics for Old: A Reassessment of the Traditional Jewish Political Leadership in 1881–1882\*

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Few scholars would dispute that the years 1881–1882, marked by the eruption of over 200 anti-Jewish riots, or pogroms, represented a dramatic turning point in modern Jewish history. In particular, it has been claimed, this moment represented the birth of a ‘New Politics’ among Eastern European Jewry. While many of the details of this process are disputed, there is broad consensus on its general features. The New Politics represented the emergence of new groups who had never before claimed a leadership role in the Jewish community, such as students, journalists, and other low-status groups. It was marked by a sharp generational split between the elders of the ‘traditional leadership’ and a generation of ‘new’, younger leaders. The New Politics represented the birth of new, modern Jewish ideologies, including proto-Zionism (Hovevei Zion [Lovers of Zion] or Palestinophilism) and Jewish varieties of socialism, culminating in the General Jewish Labour Union in Russia and Poland (the Bund). The rise of the New Politics has been extensively investigated, most notably by Professor Jonathan Frankel of the Hebrew University in his magisterial book *Prophecy and Politics*. [1]

There are two assumptions which underlie all the existing scholarship concerning the New Politics. The first is that the New Politics was a necessary response to the paralysis and deficiencies of the old leadership. The traditional leaders, it is claimed, completely failed the Jews of Russia in the crisis of 1881–1882 by their inactivity and cowardice. The second assumption, which flows logically from the first, is that only the partisans of the New Politics had a realistic vision of the needs of Russian Jewry in 1881–1882. In particular, a properly organised emigration movement of Jews out of the Empire was an absolutely necessary and logical response to the crisis.

It is easy to explain the origin of these beliefs, which are the foundation myths of the New Politics. The new ideologues of 1881–1882, often young and poor, had to respond to the challenge flung at them: ‘who appointed *you* to speak for Israel?’ They could justify their initiatives only by discrediting the policies of the rival, established political leadership. Moreover, given the vicissitudes that Jews would face in Eastern Europe after 1881–1882, as well as the fact that well over a million Jews *did* depart, the policy of emigration appeared to be vindicated by history. The young activists of 1881–1882 are consistently seen as the spiritual forefathers of the founders of the State of Israel or heroic figures in the struggle for social justice in Russia. Small wonder that history has tended to canonise them. One can find streets in Israel named after Palestinophiles such as Lev Pinsker and Moshe Leb Lilienblum, but not after traditional leaders such as Baron Horace Gintsburg or Samuel Poliakov. [2]

In this paper I would like to challenge the mythology of 1881–1882. My thesis is a simple one: the traditional leadership was far more active and engaged than admitted by the partisans of the New Politics. Moreover, in the context of the realities of the Russian Empire in 1881–1882, *they* were the ones with the more realistic prescriptions to defend the Jews from the specific dangers which they faced at that time.

The bill of indictment against the traditional leadership of Russian Jewry contains the following accusations. First, the Jewish plutocrats of St Petersburg did nothing to provide practical assistance to pogrom victims. Secondly, they misread the nature of the pogrom violence, running to the tsar to beg protection, when it was the authorities themselves who instigated or tolerated the pogroms, and, in any case, blamed them on the Jews ('Jewish exploitation'). And thirdly, they offered no support – indeed, they actively opposed – necessary strategies in 1881–1882, most notably the emigration movement.

The inaccuracy of the first charge is easily demonstrated by reference to the creation of the so-called Kiev Committee, which channelled substantial resources, including large donations collected abroad and sent on to St Petersburg, to the victims of the pogroms. The accomplishments of the Kiev Committee are even more impressive when it is recognised that it never received official permission to work beyond the provision of assistance to victims in the region, and was always forced to work in the shadow of illegality as it expanded its efforts. [3] These efforts marked a real success because the Russian government was notoriously loath to permit any sort of uncontrolled or unofficial philanthropic activity. This was even more the case with Jewish communities in the Pale of Settlement, which had more than once been the targets of official investigation under suspicion of illegal monetary collections. When such collections were discovered, they were confiscated by the authorities. [4] Under these difficult conditions, the Kiev Committee managed to disperse significant sums of money over a wide area. Prominent Jewish financiers, such as Baron Horace Gintsburg, made substantial contributions to victims from their own pockets. [5]

Of much greater significance than the claim of apathy is the charge that the traditional leadership kissed the boots of the very people who were directing violence against their own community. One of the most enduring myths of the pogroms of 1881–1882, of course, is that they were instigated, encouraged, or tolerated by the authorities – if not at the highest level, then at least at the local one. The strength of belief in this myth does not make it true. The publication of archival material in 1923 by G. Krasnyi-Admoni revealed that the government was hostile to pogroms. [6] The research of I. Michael Aronson effectively disproves the claim that there was a conspiracy which underlay the pogroms. [7] My work in post-communist archives supports my contention that the Russian government opposed pogroms at every level: the national government tried to anticipate them and insisted that regional and local authorities take every precaution against them. When pogroms nonetheless

occurred, the national government demanded in the strongest terms that they be repressed, and used all the usual forms of state coercion to put them down. (It should be remembered that as many rioters as Jews died in the pogroms of 1881–1882.) After the fact, the national government punished the rioters in a variety of ways. Whole villages were flogged where pogroms had occurred; *pogromshchiki* were imprisoned and some exiled to Siberia. The central government, including the tsar, were always desirous that the courts be as severe as possible. Many pogrom trials were moved to military courts, and pogrom cases were moved to the front of the docket in order to provide an object lesson. Local officials who were judged derelict of duty during pogroms lost their positions, and some were prosecuted. A number of governors were removed in provinces where pogroms were severe. In other words, the Russian state employed against the pogroms the weapons which it employed against other forms of anti-state violence, such as peasant disorders or the terrorist movement. [8]

Thus, there was practical logic underlying delegations to the tsar to ask for greater protection for the Jewish population. It was also politic for these delegations to emphasise the alleged role of revolutionaries in stirring up the masses against the Jews, as a way of encouraging the authorities to strike hard against the *pogromshchiki*. This was part of a general campaign of the traditional leadership to gain control of the interpretation of the disorders. This was imperative, since a public debate had broken out in the Russian press as soon as it became clear that the pogroms were a mass movement. The Judeophobe press, following past precedent, sought to defend the honour of the Russian people – depicted abroad as a hoard of bloodthirsty animals – by portraying the pogroms as an understandable protest by the ‘dark masses’ against the terrible exploitation which they suffered at the hands of the sly and crafty Jews. This was a particularly dangerous and pernicious interpretation of events. Following its logic, the best way to prevent further pogroms was to restrict the ability of the Jews to engage in ‘economic exploitation’ by reducing their already circumscribed civil rights still further. [9]

The traditional leadership, led by the so-called Gintsburg Circle in the capital, worked very hard to fight this interpretation. During the reception of a Jewish delegation on 12 May 1881, the tsar observed that ‘there were economic causes to which the Jews themselves contributed through the exploitation of the peasant by the Jew’. Instead of supinely accepting the Emperor’s judgement, members of the delegation immediately challenged this assumption, and gained royal assent to present a memorandum refuting this charge. [10] When a special envoy, Count P. I. Kutaisov, was appointed to tour the Pale of Settlement and collect information on the causes of the pogroms, members of the traditional leadership insisted on meeting with the Count, and submitting memoranda rejecting the claim of ‘economic exploitation’. [11]

Unfortunately, the new minister of internal affairs, N. P. Ignatiev, came into office already prejudiced against the Jews. He was soon convinced that

hindering the ability of Jews to exploit the peasantry, chiefly by means of removing Jews from the midst of the peasants, was the surest way to prevent further violence. On 22 August 1881, at Ignatiev's request, the Emperor ordered the creation of committees in all the provinces of the Pale of Settlement to investigate the nature of Jewish economic harm, and the best way of combating it. This was a license for Judeophobes to publicly vent their hostility to the Jews. Shortly thereafter, Ignatiev appointed a new committee within the Ministry of Internal Affairs to draft new legislation to restrict the Jews – the enactments that became known as the 'May Laws'. Thus, a double threat loomed for Jews: continued pogroms and possible new restrictions. In a sense, Russia's Jewish policy now took the form of a duel between the traditional leadership and Count Ignatiev.

The leadership conducted its campaign in a variety of ways. When the government permitted Jews to participate in the Ignatiev Committees, the leadership ensured that well-prepared, articulate defenders were appointed by the local communities and that they took an active role in the committee debates. [12] Even when they were outvoted, they were able to voice the Jewish position, and to have it included as a minority report. The Judeophobes were not given a 'free ride'.

The leadership tried to co-ordinate its efforts by holding two meetings of communal representatives in St Petersburg. These meetings, held in August and February, were much derided at the time as undemocratic and ineffective. In fact, it was a considerable accomplishment to gain permission for the assemblies from the duplicitous Ignatiev. Nor were the members simply handpicked puppets of Gintsburg and his friends, as the non-invited young activists complained. There are many contemporary reports that formal elections were held in some communities, and discussions of the sessions were amazingly frank, as became apparent when the proceedings were published in the Jewish press in 1882, after the fall of Ignatiev. [13]

The leadership also collected information, both for dispatch abroad to sympathetic defenders of persecuted Russian Jewry, but also for internal consumption, in the form of a memorandum to the tsar. The information channelled abroad, through the circle of Rabbi Spektor of Grodno, provoked an international campaign in support of the Jews, led by the editorials of the London *Times* newspaper. [14] Additional material was collected and worked into a memorandum by a close collaborator of Baron Gintsburg, Emmanuel Levin. This report, published in parts in various publications in the period of relaxed censorship after the Revolution of 1905, helped create the picture of the pogroms as a consciously designed policy, in which high state officials were involved. [15]

The central objective of the traditional leadership was to use the pogrom phenomenon to buttress their long-standing call for the extension of civil rights to the Jews of the Russian Empire. They argued that the existing corpus of Russian law, which restricted the residence and occupation rights of the Jews,

effectively placed them outside the protection of the law in the eyes of the ignorant masses. When peasants or proletarians saw illegally-resident Jews rounded up in Kiev, and marched out of the city in chains with a military convoy (a punishment usually reserved for criminals bound for Siberia), they could only conceive that the Jews must be an especially bad sort of people. When the masses were incited to defend themselves from exploitation by agitators in the press, their underdeveloped conception of law and justice could imagine nothing more sophisticated than robbery and assault. If the pogroms were to be eliminated, the dark masses had to be convinced that the Jews were under the full and complete protection of the law. The time to do this was before, not during, a pogrom.

From our distant retrospective, such arguments may appear to have been naïve in the extreme. In the context of the time, they were not. All through the reign of Alexander II the government had toyed with the possible extension of Jewish rights. Indeed, a growing number of categories – first guild merchants, university graduates, but also skilled artisans – had been given permission to live outside the Pale. [16] Accompanying the privileged categories were sizeable numbers of Jews in the guise of servants, agents, or family members, who did not have residence rights themselves. With a few exceptions – Kiev being the most notable – the authorities tended to look through their fingers at these illegal residents. Indeed, in 1880, on the eve of the pogroms, the minister of internal affairs, Makov, had issued an order regularising the legal status of Jews who had settled illegally outside the Pale before 1880. Many newspapers (including, for their own reasons, those of Judeophobe orientation) supported abolition or reduction of the Pale of Settlement. [17] There were serious proposals along these lines being discussed by officials within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With public order considerations joined to arguments of public utility and common justice, a campaign for civil rights was not an inevitable dead end in 1881. (Michael Aronson has argued this point in his study of the Ignatiev Commissions.) [18] Even if rights were not to be extended, a campaign of pressure and argument might prevent new restrictions from being imposed. This was a crucial consideration because the new MVD, Ignatiev, appeared determined to impose new liabilities. He eventually succeeded in getting the Committee of Ministers to agree to some restrictive regulations – including a ban on new Jewish settlement in peasant villages, purchase of land in the countryside, and trade on the mornings of Sundays and Christian holidays. Bad as these notorious May Laws were, they could have been immeasurably worse. Ignatiev had wanted to include in them a ban on Jewish tavern-keeping in the Pale, an enactment which would have ruined at a stroke the livelihood of tens of thousands of Jewish families. Moreover, he was unable to gain passage of his restrictions as fundamental law, having to be satisfied with their status as ‘temporary regulations’. The scepticism of the Committee of Ministers who approved his watered-down recommendations was palpable – they insisted that

they must be accompanied with an official announcement that no further violence would be permitted against the Jews. [19]

Far from ‘kissing the boots’ of their persecutors, the traditional leaders were well aware of who their true enemy was. They lobbied hard against Ignatiev during the period when the May Laws were being drafted and discussed within the government. Baron Gintsburg, who had the ear of the tsar, submitted a detailed memorandum which provided a well-argued justification for extending Jewish civil rights. Gintsburg complained about incitement against Jews in the press, and the failure of the local authorities to take preventive measures. Since most pogroms occurred in towns, and were carried out by gangs of vagrants, the wellspring of pogroms could not be the hatred of the Russian people against the Jews. Rather, pogrom agitation was effective because it was directed against a group that was treated as though it was outside the law. Although the Jews had lived in the Empire for centuries, and shed their blood for it, they were still considered ‘aliens’ (*inorodtsy*) by the law, and an easy target for violence and caprice. Moreover, in the wake of the pogroms, the authorities had exacerbated the situation by taking an ever stricter line with the Jews, forcibly expelling them from towns, shtetls, and border areas. New restrictions, rumoured to be in preparation, would strengthen the popular belief that the state itself viewed the Jews in hostile fashion. This would encourage, not prevent, further pogroms. [20]

Ignatiev was obliged to reply at length to Gintsburg’s petition. He sought to discredit the Baron by emphasising his links with the Alliance Israélite Universelle. The AIU was depicted as a secret, illegal international Jewish government, whose aims were to maintain the privileged position of the Jews, and prevent any interference by the state in their ability to exploit the native population. He was able to cite the reports of the Ignatiev Commissions, which blamed the pogroms on peasant hatred of exploitation. In summary, he claimed that ‘the actions of the Jews and their illegal government are the best demonstration of the need to implement measures and protect the Christian population from the Jewish yoke’. [21] From the tone of Ignatiev’s response, it is clear that he was not sure that he would be able to carry the government or the tsar for his policy of greater restrictions on the Jews. It is against the background of the internal debate regarding the May Laws that the alleged failure of the traditional leadership – its refusal to support mass Jewish emigration – must be judged.

The pogroms created a mass of refugees both inside and outside Russia. The most dramatic symbol of this phenomenon was the flood of refugees across the Russian–Austro-Hungarian frontier to the border town of Brody. As many as 10,000 refugees at a time were gathered here, often in the direst poverty. Their plight attracted the attention of world Jewish bodies, such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Russo-Jewish Committee in Britain. The charitable operations of these bodies, especially their decision to send substantial numbers of refugees to America, generated great excitement in the Pale. Wild rumours

periodically provoked new floods of would-be emigrants, especially when the Russian pogroms resumed in the spring of 1882. [22] Emigration became the rallying cry for partisans of the New Politics.

At first glance, their position appeared reasonable and sound: whatever one's personal view about emigration, it was a *de facto* reality. This reality argued for the urgent formation of emigration committees throughout Russia in order to give emigrants proper advice and support. These apparently rational considerations disguised an ideological subtext which sought to use the occasion to advance various schemes for the regeneration of Russian Jewry. Ideology aside, there was the simple question of practicality.

Let us examine the practical considerations: there was never any real possibility that emigration could resolve the Russian Jewish Question in general, or the pogrom emergency in particular. (It is worth remembering that the emigration of over one million Jews from the Russian Empire before 1914 had relatively little effect on the economic status of the Jews or their susceptibility to popular violence.) The resources of the bodies involved, like the Alliance, were never sufficient to do more than provide transportation for little more than 10,000 persons. The American Jewish authorities, while initially welcoming, were soon overwhelmed by the numbers and demanded a cessation of transports. No European Jewish community was keen to absorb substantial numbers of refugees. By the end of 1882, repatriation became the *de facto* solution to the refugee problem.

'Properly organised emigration committees throughout the Pale' could hardly have made any difference in this setting. At most they might have more effectively recorded those who left, which would have been convenient for the communities faced with the military draft, for whom unregistered emigration created enlistment shortfalls. To balance this useful task, the creation of such committees would probably have stirred up additional excitement and made matters worse. To complicate the picture still more, emigration from the Russian Empire was technically illegal. Despite a bewildering assortment of conflicting statements from Ignatiev in meetings with communal leaders, there is no evidence that the minister ever seriously considered making mass migration legal. [23]

While most of the emigration that actually occurred was directed to America, there was a parallel movement that advocated communal agricultural settlement in Palestine. This movement, which eventually bore the name Hoveve Zion, is remembered in heroic terms in the history of Zionism. [24] Yet whatever the long-term successes of the movement might have been (and even these were symbolic rather than practical), it offered no practical solution to the crisis of 1881–1882. It lacked even the meagre funding of the American-directed emigration, and was hopelessly undermined by an edict of the Ottoman government prohibiting exactly the kind of settlement that its founders had in mind. [25] Hoveve Zion was a movement for idealists and ideologues, not for

Russian Jewry as a whole. Yet its utopian standards were precisely those against which the activity of the traditional leadership were judged.

The traditional leadership had ample opportunity to formulate its policy on emigration. The two national meetings of communal leaders placed the question on their agendas. The question repeatedly came up when Ignatiev granted interviews to individual communal representatives, which he did throughout the early months of 1882. The emigration issue occasioned a voluminous debate in the Jewish press, both at home and abroad. At every opportunity, the traditional leadership, as a group, rejected emigration as a feasible project. A resolution adopted at the April meeting of the communal representatives declared that ‘the idea of organised emigration is inimical to the dignity of the Russian body politic and to the historic rights of the Jews in their present fatherland’. [26]

The criticism of the so-called Palestinophile press was scathing. The attitudes of the traditional leadership were blamed on cowardice (the customary bowing and scraping before officialdom), and particularly on the scorn of the communal rich for the communal poor. This was an especially effective polemical weapon in the hands of impecunious students who continually proclaimed their readiness to sacrifice their present and future well-being for the good of the Jewish masses. Some grudging recognition of the long-term objectives of the traditional leadership could be seen in the complaint that the communal big-shots wished to subvert the welfare of Russian Jewry as a whole to their own class-based interests, which would see the securing of greater civil rights which would benefit only the few – as if Baron Gintsburg and his banker associates required greater rights for themselves! The ultimate judgement was contained in a collective letter to Baron Gintsburg:

When our brothers are leaving in their hundreds and thousands . . . now when the people fears that it has no future in this country, when the rule of law has given way to mob law . . . now we see once again that its leading figures have not followed the people but have buried their faces in the sand. They are not ready to fight for the survival of the people. [27]

These perspectives, which are frequently found in the secondary literature, are a travesty of the actual situation. The crucial ingredient that it omits was the secret struggle between Ignatiev and the traditional leadership. Ignatiev was the proverbial ‘loose cannon’ who was capable of anything. Several times he declared rhetorically that ‘the western border is open to the Jews’, and he had floated a scheme to settle Jews in newly conquered areas of Central Asia. [28] What if he should make this state policy? Keep in mind that the provincial authorities were already using the pogroms as a pretext to expel ‘illegally settled Jews’, and that the putative May Laws envisioned the wholesale expulsion of Jews from the countryside. Ignatiev’s ministerial colleagues had already warned that such a policy might transfer the pogrom threat from the countryside to the towns. Might not Ignatiev have tried to overcome these objections to his schemes by announcing a programme which resettled the Jews

both internally, in Central Asia, and beyond the boundaries of the Empire? This would be following the advice of the leading Judeophobe Russian newspaper, *Novoe vremia*, which advocated a policy of making Russia inhospitable for the Jews so that they would move elsewhere, following the principle ‘*ubi bene, ibi patria*’ [my country is wherever it’s good for me]. [29]

This was a threat that the leadership had to take seriously. Moreover, it was a danger that was encouraged each time a Russian Jewish newspaper published an article calling for the Jews to seek their destiny abroad. (And Ignatiev was known to listen to what he perceived as ‘public opinion’.) Such calls threatened to undermine the campaign of the leadership to depict the Jews as full-fledged subjects who deserved the full protection of the law, and the extension of their civil rights. The rhetorical flourishes of the self-proclaimed new leadership bordered on the irresponsible, given the context of the times. This was even more the case when one considers the nebulous nature of all emigration schemes, a complaint that was frequently made by contemporaries.

It is a tribute to the leadership – despite the charges of cowardice – that they did not cease their exertions when, almost simultaneously, the May Laws were enacted and Ignatiev fell from power (over other issues). Instead, they conducted a sustained and vigorous campaign to rescind the May Laws, or at least to ensure that they were enforced in the most moderate way. A new opportunity presented itself in 1883, when the Emperor created the High Commission to Review the Existing Legislation Regulating the Jews of the Russian Empire, the so-called Palen Commission. From the first, the leadership conducted a sophisticated campaign to induce the Committee to recommend the abrogation of both the May Laws and the Pale of Settlement. This campaign was fought not only within the corridors of power, but also in the court of public opinion. My own study of this campaign reveals the commitment of the leadership and their energy in fighting for Jewish civil rights. It must be asked if the alternate programmes of revolution and emigration eventually produced a superior outcome to the fruits of their endeavours.

## CONCLUSION

This study is part of an on-going reassessment of the political activity of Russian Jewry, an approach that owes more than a little to the directions suggested by David Biale’s *Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History*. [30] I argue that Polish Jews brought into the Russian Empire their tradition of engagement with the secular power, and active efforts to direct and influence its treatment of the Jewish population. I have demonstrated and evaluated this activity in an expanded version of my first book, recently published in Russian as *Rossiia sobiraet svoix evreev* (Moscow and Jerusalem, 2000). In this paper I sought to demonstrate that similar sophisticated political activity persisted well into the late nineteenth century. It would be a mistake, I believe, to construct the

myth of the 'New Jewish Politics' at the expense of the concrete accomplishments of the old.

## Notes

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1. Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917* (Cambridge, 1981).
2. Aleks Reznikov, *Ierusalim: Ulitsy v litsakh* (Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 147–49 and 185–86.
3. By 1 October 1881, the Committee had raised 218,482 roubles. Of this, 72,965 roubles were received from abroad, including 40,000 French francs from the Alliance.
4. For the investigation of illegal collections in Grodno province, see Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybinis Archyvas (Vilnius), f. 378, op. 173 (1882), d. 53, l. 1. See also the extensive investigation in Kiev province of alleged secret Jewish fundraising in 1883, Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv-Kiev: F. 442, 833 (1883) d. 6, ll. 1–6). The *Jewish Chronicle*, No. 646 (5 August 1881) carried a report from the Berlin *Jüdische Presse* that the Russian government had absolutely forbidden the creation of a relief committee in the capital. See the complaint of the AIU on the difficulty of sending funds to Russia in *Bulletin Mensuel*, IX, 6 (June 1881), pp. 102–3.
5. *Rassvet*, No. 11 (12 March 1882).
6. *Materialy dlia istorii antievreiskikh pogromov v Rossii II*, ed. G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni (Petrograd and Moscow, 1923).
7. I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh, 1990).
8. I provide the archival evidence for these contentions in my forthcoming study ‘Southern Storms: Russians, Jews and the Pogroms of 1881–1882.’
9. J. D. Klier, ‘The Russian Press and the Anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1881’, *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, XVII, 1(1983), pp. 199–221.
10. N. M. Gelber, ‘Di rusishe pogromen onheyb di 80-er yorn in shayn fun estraykhisher diplomatisher korespondents’, *Historishe shriftn II* (Vilno, 1937), p. 469.
11. See the memoranda of the following Jewish communities: Elisavetgrad, in *Materialy dlia istorii*, pp. 226–32; Odessa, in *Materialy dlia istorii*, pp. 232–41; Kiev, in *Materialy dlia istorii*, pp. 425–29; and Khar’kov, in *Materialy dlia istorii*, pp. 312–21; and reports submitted by the state rabbis of Elisavetgrad, in *Materialy dlia istorii*, pp. 298–304; Odessa, in *Materialy dlia istorii*, pp. 304–12; and Kherson, *Rassvet*, No. 27 (3 July 1881).
12. Mordechai ben Hillel Ha-Kohen, *Olami I* (Jerusalem, 1927), p. 171.
13. See the transcript in *Nedel’naia khronika Voskhoda*, No. 31 (31 July 1882); No. 33 (14 August 1882); No. 36 (4 September 1882).

14. See Israel Oppenheim, 'The Kovno Circle of Rabbi Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor: Organising Western Public Opinion over Pogroms in the 1880s', in *Organising Rescue: National Jewish Solidarity in the Modern Period*, ed. S. I. Troen and B. Pinkus (London, 1992), pp. 91–126.
15. See Aronson, *Troubled Waters*, pp. 11–13.
16. J. D. Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 292–93.
17. For one example, see J. D. Klier, 'Kievlainin and the Jews: A Decade of Disillusionment, 1864–1873', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* VI/1 (1982), pp. 1–15.
18. I. Michael Aronson, 'The Prospects for the Emancipation of Russian Jewry during the 1880s', *Slavonic and East European Review* 55, 3 (1977), pp. 348–69.
19. There are a number of accounts of the crucial meetings of the Committee of Ministers. While they do not always agree on specifics, they all concur that Ignatiev faced substantial opposition. There is an account by E. A. Peretts (*Dnevnik E. A. Perettsa, 1880–1883* [Moscow–Leningrad, 1927]) based on discussions with several members of the Committee of Ministers. In addition, there is an official synopsis of the crucial meetings, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, f. 730, op. 1, ed. kh. 1618 (1881–1882), ll, pp. 29–43. Hereafter GARF.
20. The documents under discussion are found in GARF, f. 730, op. 1, ed. kh. 1622 (22 March 1882), and ed. kh. 1623 (April 1882). They were reprinted as 'Na shtyk mozno operet'sia, na nego nel'zia sest', ed. Valerii Stepanov, *Istochnik* 3 (1993), pp. 54–69.
21. 'Na shtyk mozno operet'sia', pp. 54–69.
22. 'Emigration Mania in Late-Imperial Russia: Legend and Reality', in *Patterns of Emigration, 1850–1914*, ed. A. Newman and S. Massil (London, 1996), pp. 21–30.
23. See the correspondence between Ignatiev and the minister of foreign affairs, N. K. Giers on emigration in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (St Petersburg), f. 821, op. 9, d. 132 (1881–1882), ll, pp. 9–14.
24. See the classic study of David Vital, *The Origins of Zionism* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 65–108.
25. Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), pp. 2–6.
26. Simon Dubnov, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland* (Philadelphia, 1916–1920), Vol. 2, p. 307. This is a slightly modified version of the English text, following the Russian version in S. M. Dubnov, 'Iz istorii vos'midesiatykh godov', *Evreiskaia starina* IX (1916), p. 13.
27. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, p. 78.
28. See the hostile reception of these ideas in the second session of the Conference of Jewish Communal Representatives, *Nedel'naia khronika Voskhoda*, No. 33 (14 August 1882).
29. *Novoe vremia*, No. 1857 (1 May 1881).

30. David Biale, *Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History* (New York, 1986).