In Hungary between the two world wars Zionism was an ideological current which aroused deep resistance in the ranks of both the political right-wing and the Jewish leadership. Zionism, an ideology which tried to reformulate the definition of Jews as a people, could not count much on allies, since it sharply opposed assimilation, which had traditionally been the stance of the official Jewish establishment, which considered the Jews a part of the Hungarian nation. At the same time, the Hungarian state and the political right-wing opposed the Zionist movement for two reasons: on the one hand, they regarded it as a form of Jewish separatism, and therefore contrary to the concept of the Hungarian nation-state; on the other hand, the officials of the Horthy regime, deeply imbued with anti-communist fears after the Commune of 1919, regarded even non-communist leftists as potentially dangerous communists. Zionists were a minority of a minority, their political status and social acceptance was very low, so the leading liberal and other organs referred to them only in cases of scandal and police investigations. The idea of an independent Jewish nation-state was rejected by all the players in Hungarian Jewish and non-Jewish political society, therefore the official tone used by Hungarian Zionist leaders was compassionate and ardently Hungarian nationalist.

The ideological position and policy of the Zionists was quite exceptional. The majority of Hungarian Jewry and the official Jewish organisations (religious communities) considered themselves true Hungarian patriots, whose Jewishness (as a unique distinctive feature) was limited to the special Jewish ‘faith’. Therefore, they denied those aspects of Jewishness which went against the Hungarian national identification. They maintained the idea of the Hungarian–Jewish symbiosis and supported the Horthy regime within and outside Hungary by all possible means. In this respect, only Orthodoxy retained beyond the basic tenets of Judaism, the special laws (halakhah) and practices which maintained the old formulations of the choseness and separateness of the Jewish people. Hungarian Orthodoxy, however, also opposed the notion of a separate Jewish nation for traditional reasons. Hungarian Zionists considered themselves members of the so-called Jewish Nation, but, for tactical reasons, they declared themselves ‘good Hungarian patriots’ because they were afraid of being persecuted by the government. Leading Zionists had good contacts with the Hungarian authorities and tried to avert their attention from the activities of their leftist groups whose ideology was overtly ‘subversive’ and Marxist. It was not collaboration, but – to a certain extent – co-operation for the sake of acceptance and survival. Emphasising only the interests of Jewry, not to be involved in the ‘national’ life of the country could lead to strange contacts and co-operation between the official Zionist representatives and the reigning right-wing governments, which made the position of Zionists very dubious in the eyes of Jewish liberals and leftists.

In the international arena, in the post-war era, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the birth of various nation-states and federations were favourable for the Jewish national movement, which, after the Balfour Declaration of 1917, became an internationally accepted factor that had to be taken more and more seriously. In 1929 the Jewish Agency (in Hebrew: Sochnut; German: Sochnew), a body that represented Zionist interests seriously and was therefore regarded as the ‘foreign ministry’ of Zionism, was established. The Jewish Agency had a permanent delegate at the League of Nations, thus they could represent the interests of the Zionists at an international forum – and not only those of the Zionists, but also those of all Jews, who came increasingly under attack in the 1930s. The Jewish Agency handled Nazi Germany in a peculiar way. The Zionist leaders, weary of boycotts, started to negotiate with the German government in 1933. In August 1933 the negotiations resulted in a commercial agreement, the so-called haavruth [transfer]. The agreement was concluded between the Anglo-Palestine Bank and the German Ministry of the Economy. The terms of the agreement were the following: the Jews who left the German Empire were allowed to transfer their capital to Palestine, and only to Palestine, by exporting German products.

Hungarian Zionists constituted a very small group and they had very little influence, so whenever they had problems, they could only hope that foreign Zionists would intervene. After Nachum Goldmann’s proposal the situation became quite strange: Hungary, an ally of Nazi Germany wished to use the ‘services’ of the Jewish Agency (that is, its political support at the League of Nations) in order to secure the rights of Hungarians beyond the borders. Over and above the concrete business transaction there was a common system of concepts that provided a background for the terms in which the parties were thinking. The Central and East European reality of ‘motherland’ and ‘territories beyond the borders’ was consonant with the conception of the Zionists,
who regarded Jews outside Palestine as minorities beyond the borders (even though the Zionist homeland as a Jewish state existed only virtually at that time). Since the two conceptions and realities did not clash (there was no territorial conflict), a kind of co-operation developed between them. However, the Hungarian Ministry of Home Affairs represented the interests of the official Hungarian Jewish establishment, an enemy of the Zionists. The Ministry of Religion and Education that was also invited to give its opinion on the issue of the Zionist collections did not support the request of the Zionists either. Since from the end of 1935 collecting was practically forbidden, the collection organised by the Hungarian Zionist Association for the Jewish victims of the Arab riots in Palestine was pronounced illegal by the authorities. In November 1936 the minister of home affairs called upon the chief of the police, the leaders of the gendarmerie and the first officials of the municipalities to start proceedings against the Hungarian Zionist Association for the collection of donations without permission. [2]

PRELIMINARIES

The Hungarian Zionist movement was composed of various ideological currents: it had leftist and rightist groups, not to mention the political ‘centre’ (Klal Zionists or General Zionists) and the religious Zionists (Mizrachi). Leftist groups were under very heavy pressure because of their alleged contacts and alliance with the communists, therefore the leadership of the official Hungarian Zionist Association (HZA) was in the hands of the politically ‘neutral’ General Zionists.

From 1933 the use of force against Zionists on the part of the police increased and there were serious problems with the collections as well. Zionists had been collecting money in every country for their own cause. In Hungary, the Ministry of Home Affairs always gave permission for collection for the duration of one year, and a new application had to be submitted each year to get an extension. The great Zionist monetary funds, the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet le-Israel), and the Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) collected money through the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews, a pro-Zionist organisation. Nachum Goldmann also mentions this in one of his letters written to the Hungarian foreign administration and estimates the number of money boxes put out by the organisation at four to five thousand. [3] The collected money was transferred to Palestine with the permission of the Ministry of Home Affairs and with the assistance of the Hungarian National Bank, then goods were purchased and sent to the colonisation funds. [4]

Besides the issue of collections there were some other problems. After 1933 the Zionists were put under close observation by the Hungarian authorities. The Department of Public Security of the Ministry of Home Affairs received information that several communist parties had asked the political secretariat of the Comintern for directives on how to relate to the Zionist movement. [5] Whether the document is genuine is rather uncertain, since there are no other sources in the archives or anywhere else to support this claim. Yet the document says that ‘this resolution confirms the supposition that there is a close relationship between the Comintern and Jews living in Palestine’. The head of Department VII of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Department for Public Security) sent the document to police headquarters in Budapest and in the provinces with the comment that, relying upon this document, the police should observe the Zionist movement and report any concrete facts. [6]

The year 1936 turned out to be even harder for the Zionists. By then not only left-wing Zionists, but the whole Zionist movement was being harassed by the police. The work of the Pro-Palestine Association was also hindered: in the course of that year there was a police action against them. On 27 March 1936 Péter Szigeti and his companions were arrested for underground activity. [7] The police claimed that thirteen out of the thirty-nine arrested were members of the Marxist Zionist organisation, the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair, and some of them frequented the Zionist ken [local group] in Kertész Street as shikhva [generation] members or as mere sympathisers. Some of those arrested went to the Jewish secondary school. The charge was that they held ‘seminars of a communist kind’ in their flats and were planning to go to the provinces in the summer to teach people the basic tenets of Zionism and Socialism.

Both the press of the Jewish religious community and the Zionist press protested against the charge of communism with indignation. Yet the investigations continued. Gyula Miklós, president of the Hungarian Zionist Association, went to the police to ask for information about the events. [8] The president dissociated himself from the groups belonging to the ‘main group’ of the Erez Yisrael ha-Ovedet (a left-wing coalition) and declared that the Association disapproved of their ideology.

Because of the ex-shomer membership of Szigeti and his companions the police arrested all the hakhsharah members (members of Zionist training-centres), released them only after two days through the intervention of Gyula Miklós, and finally cancelled the proceedings against them. Miklós’s letter shows the attitude of the police towards the Zionists. [9] They told Gyula Miklós that if the ideology of the Hungarian Zionist Association was similar to that of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair, then the whole Hungarian Zionist movement would be abolished by order of the police. These were the circumstances which compelled the president to dissociate himself from the left. In the course of the investigation the police mapped the offices, hakhsharot, and personal
relations of the main groups. [10] The groups were ranked according to their degree of leftism (Poale Zion, Stam Chalutz, No’ar ha-Dati, Dror, ‘Shomer’ Hatzair).

The ‘foreign ministry’ of Zionism, the Jewish Agency, started an action. On 22 June Nachum Goldmann handed over a memorandum to László Velics, who represented Hungary in Geneva at the League of Nations. [11] In this memorandum he asked the authorities not to hinder the work of the Zionists. He asked for the authorisation of collections for the Hungarian Zionist Association and the alteration of the articles of association of the Pro-Palestine Association. He refers to the fact that ‘there is no country in the world where the government would take a position in internal Jewish debates which are unrelated to the behaviour of Jews as citizens and their acceptance of obvious duties as loyal citizens of their state’. And he continues: ‘Naturally there are Hungarian Jews who oppose Zionism. But this conflict arose because of internal antagonisms within the Jewish community and has nothing to do with either Hungarian interests or the basic principles of Hungarian internal and foreign policy . . .’ Goldmann even proposed to travel to Budapest immediately if it was deemed necessary. The document clearly demonstrates the standpoint of the Zionists led by Goldmann: Jews as Hungarian citizens must accept all the regulations applying to every Hungarian citizen, but, as members of another people, they must comply with some special requirements. Beyond these requirements there is the conception of a cultural, religious, or ‘national’ minority. According to this logic, the Hungarian state has nothing to do with these conflicts within the Jewish nation, since they concern people who are ethnically non-Hungarians. Velics mailed the document in a diplomatic letter, but noted that he did not think that there was much chance of the abolition of the restriction on collecting donations.

The arrest of the members of the shomer hakhsharah of Kálvária Square (Budapest) formed part of the investigations against the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair. [12] The police put the members of the hakhsharah under police supervision and saw to it that those not from Budapest were expelled from the capital. [13] Because of these events the shomers (members of Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair) closed down all but two of their hakhsharon by the end of the summer. [14] At roughly the time of the police proceedings the Hungarian Zionist Association and the leftist groups informed the otherwise well-informed Jewish Agency about the events. On 13 April the Hungarian Zionist Association sent a letter to the Jewish Agency. [15] In this letter they reported that one evening about one hundred members of the hakhsharot had been arrested. According to the Association the danger was over because the activities of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair were restricted to the 7th and 8th districts of Budapest. The police objected to boys and girls living together: they held them to be communists because of their life-style, which represented an attack on the social conventions predominant at that time. In this letter the leaders of the Zionist movement point out with sound intuition that the police officials were unable to make a distinction between ‘Palestine-centred collectivist education and communism’. This attitude was manifested when – probably during the summer – the police arrested campers who had no permission to camp in Márianosztra. [16]

While it seemed at least probable that the Szigeti ‘group’ had connections with the communists, and therefore their treatment was consistent with the internal logic of the regime, the same cannot be said about the measures taken against the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair. At any rate, the political investigative division of the police called upon the gendarmerie and the police in the provinces to investigate in their areas and report to the police in Budapest. But the affair continued on a larger scale and culminated in a speech in parliament. MP András Gergelyfy spoke about a communist group exposed by the police and dwelt on the issue of Zionism as well. [17] Gergelyfy demanded that radical steps be taken against the Zionists and said that he regarded the measures taken so far as merely symbolic. A ‘radical’ step in this sense would have meant the elimination of the Association. However, Miklós Kozma, minister of home affairs, defended the Association, making a clear distinction between the Association and left-wing groups. [18]

The situation was considered so serious by the Organisation Department of the Jewish Agency (operating in Jerusalem) that they asked the He-Halutz in Hungary in a letter to try and adapt themselves to the situation and not do anything that would endanger the existence of the Hungarian Zionist Association. [19] They argued in favour of the Association saying that they had not been hostile when answering the questions of the authorities about the left. At the same time they pointed out that they had started negotiations in Palestine with the representative of the Hechalutz about the situation.

On 4 July Miklós Kozma called upon all the police forces to investigate and start proceedings against the Erez Yisrael ha-Ovedet. This shows that the situation was becoming more critical than ever. [20] In the briefing he condemned the Hungarian Zionist Association even more than in the parliament for the ‘implicit’ toleration of the left. The minister of home affairs specified the statutes that could be used against the Zionists and asked the police forces to start proceedings only if they had proof. [21]

Buk in his letter mentioned above also said that the police had advised the Ministry of Home Affairs to eliminate the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair. [22] The Hungarian Zionist Association did not want to come into conflict with the Hungarian authorities, and be labelled as comrades of the left-wing Zionists, so it decided not to intervene. In compliance with the official position taken by the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews led by Ignác Pfeiffer, the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair was excluded from all the Zionist collections. This was extremely important, because in Hungary the Jewish national funds, the Keren Kayemet and the Keren Hayesod, functioned as sections of the Pro-Palestine Association, thus the decision meant that the shomers were excluded
completed from the work of the national funds. Some were still under police surveillance in November. [23] The frequent mistakes committed at lower levels of the system of surveillance compelled the minister of home affairs to call upon the police authorities at the lower levels not to stigmatise certain associations just because they had some members with ‘subversive ideas’. [24]

AN ATTEMPT AT INTERVENTION

The Organisation Department (Sochnut) contacted Nachum Goldmann and asked him to negotiate in Riga and Budapest after the World Zionist Congress. [25] The Jewish Agency tried to exert pressure through negotiations as well as through the founding of a party. In the meantime the Zionist perspective changed from month to month depending on the means and the degree of seriousness with which they were hoping to accomplish some of their projects. The intervention of foreign Zionist leaders should also be interpreted in that light, since even after lengthy negotiations and exploratory talks they could not come to an agreement on a joint collection with the Jewish community. The negotiations started as early as in 1935 between the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews (József Patai, Ignác Pfeiffer, Bertalan Hatvany), the representatives of the Jewish community (Samu Stern, Sándor Eppler), the Zionist delegates from Jerusalem and the Hungarian Zionist Association, about setting up an association which would take into account the particular situation of Hungarian Jews. [26] The negotiations were coloured by the birth and then the ‘death’ of the Jewish People’s Party of the Jewish community, which was called into existence for the community elections of March 1936 by the Zionists with great ambitions, demonstrating their attempt to try to use publicity and bring about a change in the leadership of the Jewish community from the outside. The idea of setting up a ‘patriotic’ Palestine Association cannot be separated from the relative lack of success of the collections of the Pro-Palestine Association and the prohibition of collections.

In April 1936 József Patai, editor-in-chief of the periodical Múlt és Jövő [Past and Future] and Sándor Eppler, secretary of the Israelite Religious Community of Budapest went to Palestine to negotiate with Arthur Hantke (head of the Keren Hayesod) and Menachem Ussischkin (head of the Keren Kayemet le-Israel). [27] At the meeting on 26 April Eppler announced that the Jewish community of Budapest had made an agreement with the Zionists that they would take over the job of the Pro-Palestine Association, and the committee would consist both of Zionists and non-Zionists, fifty–fifty, after the model of the Jewish Agency. Ussischkin even accepted the proposal that half of the net income of the Keren Kayemet le-Israel and the Keren Hayesod would be allocated to the establishment of a Hungarian Jewish colony in Palestine. The Hungarian negotiators calculated with the settlement of about fifty people, and the leaders in Jerusalem hoped that if the Jewish leadership joined the work for Palestine, the income would rise to eight thousand pounds. The Zionists hoped that the National Bureau and the president of the Jewish community in Budapest would declare to the Hungarian government that both funds were official institutions of the Hungarian Jews. But the hoped-for declaration failed to take place and Hantke who negotiated with Stern in Budapest in November could not reach a final agreement either. The difference of opinion consisted of the fact that Stern’s team wanted to have a say in how the emigration would take place and how the collected sum would be allocated, and this would have involved the alteration of the ‘constitution’ of the Jewish Agency. Finally this conflict led to the foundation of a separate organisation for the Jewish community.

‘THE SITUATION IS GETTING WORSE’

At the beginning of November 1936 the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair was involved in a scandal again. In the first half of the month Hetényi (Deputy of the Chief of the Budapest Police) and his group arrested more than 64 people suspected of illegal communist activity. The right-wing press linked the illegal activity with the visit to Budapest of Ciano, Italian minister of foreign affairs. There was a secondary school student, a shomer, who had allegedly recruited fifteen students. [28] The arrest of the members of the hakhsharah of the Hechalutz (this was the other name of Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair in Hungary) at 6 Klaúzál Square turned out to be more fatal. The halutzim were released after two days and the two hakhsharot in Budapest were closed with the consent of the Palestine Office. [29] One of the members concerned asked the Jewish Agency to send more certificates (British ‘passports’ to Palestine) than usual because of the difficult situation. This request was supported by the Palestine Office which sent the letter. [30] There is another document about the reasons and the course of the elimination of the hakhsharot. On 14 December 1936, that is, on the day of the resolution about the takeover of the hakhsharot, Frigyes Fried informed the Organisation Department about the events in a letter written in the name of the Hungarian Zionist Association. [31] According to Fried, the reason for the takeover was obviously the fact that the authorities did not recognise the right of surveillance of the Palestine Office at all, and held the Hungarian Zionist Association responsible for everything. Besides, the police demanded that even ex-shomers should not be allowed to participate in the work of the Hungarian Zionist Association. The hakhsharah of the Hechalutz was closed and the Stam Chalutz also promised to liquidate itself. [32] The Zionists turned to Samu Stern for mediation, but he demanded that control of the hakhsharot be taken over, otherwise even the National
Bureau could not represent their interests. Thus all co-operation with the shomers ended. [33] They were not admitted to the shekel committee either. Fried promised to support the request of the haksharat to be granted extra certificates.

The Hungarian Zionist Association was constantly compelled to dissociate itself from those who were arrested. There was practically not a single issue of the Zsidó Szemle [Jewish Review] in which prominent Zionist leaders did not publish articles or declarations dissociating themselves from Bolshevism, the shomers, or both. [34] In the office of the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews there was a search on 2 December, and the sums it had collected for the ‘Mifal Bitzaron’ (the Hebrew name of this special collection for the Jewish victims of Palestinian Arab revolts from 1936 on) were confiscated. The secretary, Ede Marton, was interrogated at the police station. [35] The ‘charge’ was collection without permission, but the real cause was increasing distrust. [36] As a consequence of the steps taken by the police, the work of the Jewish national funds was suspended. The Hungarian Zionist Association informed the Keren Kayemet le-Israel, the Keren Hayesod and the centres of the Palestine Office about the events. [37]

The debilitating measures taken by the police compelled the Hungarian Zionist Association to take a radical step. On 14 December 1936 the leadership of the Hungarian Zionist Association decided to take over the Palestine Office. They also took control over the haksharat, without waiting for the resolution of the Jewish Agency. [38] They claimed that the association headed by Béla Fényes did not meet their expectations. Chaim Barlas himself, head of the Aliyah Department (Sochnut) who stayed in Budapest for a meeting in March explained this to Fényes. As they wrote: ‘The postponement of this decision for even a short while endangers the existence of not only the haksharat, but the whole Hungarian Zionist movement.’ [39] As a consequence of the events Menachem Iczkovits, sheliah of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair, was ordered to leave Hungary. The Warsaw and the Merkhavyah centres (in Palestine) of the shomers bombarded the Jewish Agency with letters. [40] They demanded the setting up of a separate monetary fund because of the bad financial situation of the halutzim.

With the elimination of the haksharat the problems of the left increased and only the Mizrachi and the Klal Zionists participated in the work of the Hungarian Zionist Association. [41] On the day following the takeover of the haksharat the Association called upon the haksharat in a circular letter to accept its supervision. The haksharat of the Mizrachi refused to sign the circular. [42] But by now the harassment of the police was affecting not only the leftist groups. On 21 December the members of the Klal Zionist haksharat were taken to the police station and were released only after twenty-four hours. The reason for the arrests was quite precarious since these haksharat were already under the supervision of the Hungarian Zionist Association.

INCREASED ZIONIST DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

The deterioration of the situation in Hungary activated foreign Zionist centres. In a letter written to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency the Keren Kayemet went as far as considering the elimination of Zionist activity in Hungary. [43] They also mentioned that they had contacted Nachum Goldmann in Geneva and asked him to mediate. It is the Keren Kayemet which mentions the idea of a boycott of Hungarian products in Palestine for the first time, an idea that Goldmann also adopts. [44] ‘As far as I know, we purchase products for 200,000 pounds from Hungary and this sum is a powerful argument’, wrote Nachum Goldmann, the Zionist ‘minister of foreign affairs’. But the idea of a boycott was rejected in Jerusalem at the beginning of 1937 because, ‘besides the problem of tactical expediency’, they were afraid that these products could not be replaced by others and the importers would not obey the order of the Sochnut. Therefore, writes Lauterbach, head of the Department of Organisation of the Sochnut, ‘we must refrain from this and refer to the importance of the connections only in a positive light’. [45] In fact, the volume of trade between Hungary and Palestine represented a mere 0.44 percent of the total volume of Hungarian trade, and therefore not much could be expected from a boycott. [46]

In a letter written to Selig Brodetsky, the political secretary of the Jewish Agency, Lauterbach paints a rather gloomy picture of the situation in Hungary, as well as of its causes. [47] Zionist activity was practically suspended in Hungary and ‘our local representative has neither the authority nor the influence to change this policy’, he writes. [48] He also demands that Goldmann’s action on behalf of the Hungarian Zionists should be followed by a similar one in London.

The year 1937 was full of diplomatic attempts and harassment by the police. The Hungarian Zionist Association was at a disadvantage, since no more collections were allowed and several haksharat had to be closed down when the Jewish community established its own Palestine organisation on 17 January 1937, the MISZETTE (Association of Hungarian Israelites for the Support of Settlements in the Holy Land and Elsewhere), which enjoyed the confidence of the Ministry of Religion and Education. The Ministry of Religion and Education – with which Stern’s team had excellent contacts – wished to concentrate the collections in one hand, although the certificates for immigration to Palestine issued by the British authorities could be distributed only by the Jewish Agency. These certificates were given to the local Zionist organisations, which were mostly
independent of the hierarchy of the Jewish community, thus the conflict was inherent in the organisation from its birth.

The MISZETTE itself was established as a result of the confrontation with the Zionists. The articles of the association were aimed at supporting ‘Israelite citizens who have settled in Palestine and in other states’. Interestingly enough, after their initial aversion the Zionists adopted an expectant attitude, and the Zsidó Szemle published an article discussing the community of work and interests. [49] Even Lauterbach himself considered it probable that the beginning of the work for Palestine in the Jewish community was related to the deterioration of the circumstances of Zionism in Hungary. [50] At the same time he pointed out that preparations for eventual foreign intervention must be made in Budapest.

The Zionist leaders were powerless against the MISZETTE beyond a mere declaration that they disapproved of the establishment of the association. They asked Goldmann to contact non-Zionists as well. [51]

Actually, it was to the advantage of left-wing Zionists that their problems were linked with the general problems of Zionism in Hungary. The fact that the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair became illegal, its hakhsharot were closed down and its members were constantly supervised and harassed by the police ceased to be insults against a minority; they became substantial proof of the limitation of freedom of movement. The intervention of foreign Zionist leaders was partly due to the strength of left-wing movements in Palestine and to the continual presence on the agenda of their grievances. Besides their lamentations about the persecution of the movement, the leaders of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair in Palestine and in Poland could also refer to their successful participation in the construction of the Keren Kayemet le-Israel and the Keren Hayesod. [52]

At the beginning of January the leadership of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair had a secret meeting in Rishon le-Zion in Palestine with the participation of famous shomer leaders, Meir Yaari, Yaakov Chazan and others. [53] They also discussed the situation in Hungary. Several participants, for example Zvi Kolben, called for sanctions against the Hungarian Zionist Association, which, they claimed, weakened the position of the left, but this idea was finally rejected, and the temporary dissolution of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair was agreed upon. Yaari wanted to set up a committee of investigation, but the conditions in Hungary did not make this possible, for the sheliah Iczkovits had been expelled from the country. [54]

NACHUM GOLDMANN IN BUDAPEST

On 12 February 1937 Goldmann, the Zionist ‘minister of foreign affairs’, arrived in Budapest. For reasons of security, the police did not want to allow him to lecture in the lecture hall of the Hungarian Zionist Association, but some people, among them Endre Fall, secretary of the right-wing Revisionist League, which aimed at regaining the territories annexed from Hungary after the First World War stood up for him, and he was finally allowed to speak. [55] On 13 February Goldmann had a talk with Gábor Apor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Goldmann mostly talked about the community of interests linking Hungarian and Zionist ‘foreign policies’. Apor was ‘receptive’, but did not promise anything. [56] The reference to the community of interests was a tactical device on Goldmann’s part, since he promised to support the Hungarian state at the League of Nations in exchange for the normalisation of the activities of the Hungarian Zionists. He mentioned that even revision was in the interest of the Jews, because in Hungary, in contrast with Romania, they lived happily; this shows that he knew what the other party wanted to hear. The Jewish Agency was also in need of support, since the new plan for the division of Palestine had to be endorsed. Goldmann offered that if the authorities did not hinder Zionist work, he would use his ‘influence’ in the League of Nations and co-operate with the Hungarian delegation in minority matters. This was not merely an irresponsible promise. According to a report written to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1938 Goldmann often co-operated with Hungarian diplomats. [57] The leaders of the Jewish Agency were not very influential policy-makers, but most of the right-wing Central and Eastern European statesmen believed that they were the representatives of the so-called ‘Jewish world power’. This belief was supported and maintained by the Zionists themselves, who always referred to their influence in the League of Nations and the ‘world media’.

The Jewish Agency wished not only to solve the problems of Hungarian Jews, but also to support its own ‘national’ claims. On 13 September 1937 Goldmann sent a letter of several pages about the situation in Palestine to Balla (one of the secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), in the hope that Hungary would align itself with the Agency when the League of Nations discussed the plans for division. [58] A parallel action was launched in London: preparations were made for negotiations with the Hungarian ambassador. In mid-March both Arthur Lourie and Brodetsky visited the secretary of the Hungarian Embassy – separately, as their letters prove – informed him of the situation and handed over a short memorandum. [59]

The problems reflected in the usual yearly report of the board and the National Executive Committee of the Hungarian Zionist Association about the activity of the Association in 1936 and 1937 was published in September 1937. The report states that the hakhsharot of the boys and the girls had been separated, but that this could be effected only after the takeover of the hakhsharot. The report also mentions that at the beginning of the year the authorities had banned several programs. Collections were still prohibited, therefore Goldmann,
through Buk, his ‘man’ in Budapest, offered to come to the Hungarian capital on 14 or 15 October. But the foreign affairs leadership deemed that the trip was not reasonable, since they were unable to convince either the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Ministry of Religion and Education (to whom they had appealed in April 1937). [60] The policy of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Religion and Education was different from that of the foreign affairs leadership. The policy of the former two was not motivated by seeking Western support for the minority rights of Hungarians ‘beyond the borders’, but by the maintenance of the Hungarian Jewish establishment. The Zionist leaders in London proposed another meeting to the Hungarian ambassador, which took place on 2 November. They managed to convince the ambassador who stated that he considered the request of the Zionists justified and reconcilable with Hungarian interests.

Stern’s team, which controlled the Israelite Religious Community of Budapest and the National Bureau was definitely more influential in Hungary than the Zionists, who had mostly good ‘foreign’ contacts. These priorities were manifest in ministerial support: the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Religion and Education favoured Stern’s team, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs favoured the Zionists.

DEFINITIVE ACTION AGAINST THE ZIONISTS

Surprisingly, a new and extremely large-scale action started against the collectivist hakhsharot, which were regarded by the police as suspicious. It seemed that the authorities intended to cut off all the Zionist activities held ‘subversive’ or ‘illegal’. On the one hand, because leftist Zionist activity was identified with communist activity, which was strengthening at that time, and on the other, because the composition of leftist Zionist groups was known by the police. In some cases the authorities found Zionist members among the young communists and vice versa. It seems that their social background was common in some cases: young people from the Jewish lower middle-class turned to Zionism or communism, as both movements expressed their revolutionary attitude towards the prevailing social and political regime. There was a permanent fluctuation between the two ideological and political ‘protest’ movements.

The political investigative division of the police celebrated the biggest Zionist ‘catch’ of the 1930s in the night of 2–3 November. Members of the hakhsharot of the two Klal Zionist organisations, the Poale Zion and the Dror, were arrested, amounting to thirty-five people. The 5 November telephone report of Sombor-Schweinitzer mentions the arrest of thirty-one people. [61] No communist propaganda material was found during the search, so, as Sombor-Schweinitzer wrote, ‘it will hardly be possible to start criminal action, but it is possible to start an administrative procedure, since among those arrested there are notorious communists, persons under police supervision, foreign citizens and people from the provinces who have no decent occupation and source of income in the capital’. We have a unique report about the events, since Chaim Barlas was staying in Budapest at the time and wrote a detailed letter to the Aliyah Department of the Sochnut on 17 November. [62] The searches and the arrests took place late at night (the hakhsharot of the Mizrachi were not involved) and one of the main reasons was that girls were found in the boys’ lodgings. Barlas urged the Sochnut to send a Hechalutz sliach to Hungary, because according to his information the Zionist groups would be abolished.

The administrative procedure started and those from the provinces were conveyed to their place of origin. [63] On 7 November there was an anti-hakhsharah demonstration at the Faculty of Humanities and in the courtyard of the Technical University in Budapest, and the leader of the latter wore a badge with a swastika on it. [64]

The arrests and the right-wing press hysteria – to be detailed later on – in which so-called liberal papers, such as those of Andor Miklós, the Jewish press-magnate, also participated, shocked the Hungarian Zionist leadership. In a letter written to Barlas, Miklós Buk reports that he had been to the police where he was told that the Hungarian Zionist Association must close down the hakhsharot. The policemen referred to some ‘confidential information’ about Bolshevik propaganda materials circulated in the hakhsharot. By that time the Hungarian Zionists had also decided to ask foreign Zionists to exert pressure. [65] The Zsidó Szemle published a special issue entitled ‘What Is the Truth About the Hakhsharot?’, which contained the declaration of the national executive committee of the Hungarian Zionist Association in which they categorically denied the rumours. [66] The right-wing press initiated an extremely heated propaganda campaign against the Zionists. The rough style of the attacks in the press matched their content well. According to the title page of the 5 November issue of Függetlenség [Independence]: ‘The hakhsharot’s aim was to transform Hungary into a Zionist state’. The objectivity of the social democratic Népszava [People’s Voice] and Rassay’s liberal Esti Kurír [Evening News] was quite a treat in this mostly hysterical choir (the exceptions being the press of the Jewish community and the Zionist press). The writer of an article in the Népszava had obtained information from ‘a source familiar with the Zionist movements’. The Poale Zion is a social democratic organisation, and the allegedly Bolshevik shomers are persecuted in Russia, he writes. There are no Bolsheviks among the Zionists, and – naturally – there are no Nazis either. Bolsheviks are sought and found elsewhere by the police.

The situation was aggravated, and the actions of the police, the internal struggle of the different groups, as well as the attitude of the authorities who were unable to differentiate between the groups compelled the
Hungarian Zionist leaders to suspend the activity of the Palestine Office temporarily. Béla Fényes quit the Association and its sphere of activity was taken over by the Hungarian Zionist Association.

The issue of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair became a general Zionist issue concerning every Zionist group. The halutz organisation of the ‘bourgeois’ Zionists, the Hechalutz Ha-Klal Ha-Zioni, was also compelled to close its haksharot, and even the Mizrachi had to take the same step, with the exception of one haksharah for girls. [67] The fact that the activities of the Zionist movement were so seriously hindered and that the whole movement was afflicted, irrespective of party affiliations, changed the attitude of the left. They could see that they were not alone with their problems and they could sense that their persecution was only part of the pressure against the whole movement.

The harassment was extended to the provinces as well. László Gonda, a teacher at the Jewish secondary school in Debrecen, who was also the secretary of the local Zionist Association, was summoned by a political detective who warned him that there would be grave consequences if it turned out that any of the Zionist youth movements had communist sympathies. The detective even named the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair movement as suspicious. [68] Because of the harassment the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair withdrew into apartments and formed groups there. According to a police report dated from November, twenty to thirty such groups, the so-called Kibbutz Heim, were operating in Budapest. [69] According to the political security department, the Hungarian Zionist Association tried to legalise the haksharot as Poel groups.

The renewed activity is indicated by the frequent trips of the sliachs. The Erez Yisrael ha-Ovedet was legalized as the Library Section of the Hungarian Zionist Association. Another report from the same month relates the investigations in Budapest based on the information of the Miskolc police. [70] According to the findings of the investigation the shomer groups were looking for new premises and the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair formed a new group under the name ‘Salome’. Both reports prove that the movement and the groups mentioned above were continually supervised.

GOLDMANN IN BUDAPEST AGAIN

In February 1938 Goldmann came to Budapest to carry out negotiations once again. His planned speeches were permitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs only after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs exerted serious pressure. The reason why there were problems with permission was that the revisionist Zionists circulated pamphlets and announced that they would disturb the visit, therefore the deputy head of the state security department of the police wanted to dissuade the Zionists from delivering the lecture. [71] The reason why the Zionist right-wing disliked Goldmann was not related to the Hungarian problems, but to the fact that Goldmann, as the deputy of the Jewish Agency at the League of Nations, supported the plan for the division of Palestine, and opposed the revisionist slogan ‘Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan’. [72] The Association took special precautions: the invitations to the lecture were distributed only after strict checking, and they planned to employ the civilian police of the National Association of Veteran Soldiers. The importance of the event is demonstrated by the fact that at the cabinet meeting on 4 February Kánya, minister of foreign affairs, interceded with József Széll, minister of home affairs, on Goldmann’s behalf. [73] There are no documents about the conversation with Gábor Apor, but we know that the visit had no direct consequences. [74] On 4 February Goldmann had a talk with Tomcsányi, state secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and was promised that the request of the Pro-Palestine Association to renew the authorisation for collections would be granted shortly. [75] While in Budapest, Goldmann met with representatives of the Erez Yisrael ha-Ovedet, who shared with him the grievances of the Zionist left. [76]

The Hungarian Zionist Association and the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews appealed to Hungarian governmental organs in a joint petition on 11 February. [77] The petition summed up the grievances of the Zionists in four points: the hindering of collections, the issue of the haksharot, the hindering of foreign lecturers, and the ‘grievances ensuing from the activities of revisionist Zionists’. In all four points they asked for the liberalisation of working circumstances and the solution of the above-mentioned problems. They complained that ‘lately’ the authorities had refused to give permission for the lectures of foreign lecturers, or ‘ignore our notifications’ of forthcoming lectures. The petition stated that in Hungary Zionism was not a political affair and Zionists had no aspirations to be treated as a national minority. In connection with the haksharah issue the petition declared that

the Hungarian Zionist Association has asked the police several times that if they have objections to any particular haksharah member, they should name that person and the Association would dismiss him or her from the haksharah. But the Association never received such a request from the police. Still on several occasions the police arrested members of the haksharah and released them only after several days of investigation.

They also mentioned the deleterious press campaign and the fact that the haksharah had been closed. They asked the police not to hinder the work of the workshops when the Association was allowed to do the supervision again, and preparatory workshops could be set up again ‘when immigration to Palestine will be possible on a larger scale’. [78]
On 1 March 1938 Goldmann wrote a letter to Gábor Apor. He mentioned that he had talked to László Kádár (head of the administrative security department of the Ministry of Home Affairs), who said that the Ministry of Home Affairs did not object to granting authorisation for collections in principle, but the Ministry of Religion and Education made this dependent upon the consent of the leadership of the Jewish community. Goldmann, in a manner untypical of him, burst out:

Maintaining the position that no collections or other activities should be allowed without the consent of the Neolog leadership means in fact that by using the power of the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Ministry of Religion and Education, Counsellor Stern is appointed dictator of the Hungarian Jews. . . . [79]

The Zionist leaders also experimented with the solution they tried with Germany, that is, economic agreement. After the enactment of the first anti-Jewish law (in May 1938) the Jewish Agency and the Hungarian National Bank prepared a transfer agreement. [80] The Hungarian Zionists tried to reach an agreement – similar to the one the German Jews had achieved – with the Hungarian authorities. The Jewish Agency submitted a memorandum entitled ‘On the Transfer Agreement between Hungary and Palestine’, signed by Yitzhak Grunbaum, to the Hungarian National Bank. [81] The strength of the Zionist movement at the time is reflected in this memorandum, which contains a detailed description of the activities of the Jewish Agency (its structure, as well as its immigration and transfer policy), demonstrating that the Sochnut intended to be taken seriously and accepted as an equal partner. A separate chapter was devoted to the planned agreement. According to the memorandum, the advantage for Hungary lay in the fact that the Sochnut would pay in hard currency for those Hungarian products exported to Palestine for which Hungary would have had to pay in hard currency (for example, raw materials and other goods). They also planned to cover the cost of emigration of poor Jews at the expense of the rich emigrants.

Transfer hard currencies would be acquired ‘on the basis of a certain proportion of the export of Hungarian goods to Palestine, through a certain proportion of hard currencies from Hungarian export to the Middle East and other countries, as well as through the clearing of financial support sent to Hungarian Jewish individuals and institutions by various Jewish organisations and persons’. The idea was that the Hungarian Zionist Association would set up a transfer organisation. [82] The agreement between the Sochnut and the Hungarian government would cover a specific period, since the creation of the transfer organisation took time, as did the arrival of hard currency from the first shipments. The Sochnut leaders suggested that there should be a three-month start-up period and that the agreement should cover a one-year period.

The Hungarian Zionist Association took the necessary steps, and W. Feichenfeld, the Sochnut’s representative, began negotiations in January 1939. [83] It was announced at the annual meeting of the Hungarian Zionist Association on 26 March 1939 that the Hungarian government had in principle agreed to the transfer agreement and that ‘negotiations are in progress.’ [84] However, as the war engulfed increasingly larger areas of Europe, this solution was no longer feasible and another one had to be found for the problems of local Jewry. [85]

On 2 July 1939 the leaders of the Welfare Bureau of Hungarian Jews, set up by the Jewish community and the Chevra Kadisha of Pest in December 1938, organised a meeting. The Welfare Bureau submitted a letter to the Hungarian National Bank in which they reported on the negotiations between Feilchenfeld and the bank. [86]

Feilchenfeld wished to achieve the transfer of goods to the value of 500,000 pounds. According to a document of the Welfare Bureau, the negotiations proceeded well and the Hungarian National Bank was ready to accept the offer. [87] He also offered some 90–100 certificates for wealthy businessmen and their families, skilled workers (15 persons) and students (50 persons) who would study at the agricultural schools of Haifa. The precondition of emigration was that the businessmen had to have at least 1,000 pounds per person. Feilchenfeld wanted to link the sum offered by the American Joint Distribution Committee and his proposal; he suggested that a certain percentage of the sum given by the Joint be used to cover emigration costs. [88] The efforts of the Jewish Agency to reach an agreement similar to the German transfer agreement were unsuccessful.

CONCLUSION

Motivated by the principle of ‘divide et impera’ the Ministry of Home Affairs granted authorisation for collections to both the Pro-Palestine Association and the MISZETTE association of the Jewish community in 1939. The reason why Goldmann and foreign Zionist organisations in general tended to intervene was, on the one hand, the relative weakness of Zionism in Hungary, and on the other, the opportunity that the connection with Hungary seemed to offer for making foreign political deals. But the illusion of a ‘community of interests’ faded quickly as a result of the anti-Jewish laws, the various interests and concepts of the Hungarian governmental bodies which were often in conflict with each other, and the attitude of the official Jewish leadership. The leaders of the Jewish Agency acknowledged with regret that the group of Samu Stern, which
had hardly any international prestige, was much more influential in Hungary than the international Zionist organisation, which had excellent connections.

After 1939 the attitude of the Jewish Agency changed. After the introduction of the second anti-Jewish law they were no longer interested in the issue of the Hungarian minorities beyond the borders. As for Hungarian diplomacy, they used the connection with Goldmann to test the international reaction to the laws against the Jews. This is how this ill-matched couple drifted apart in the storms of history.
LIST OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Betar (Brith Trumpeldor = Trumpeldor Association): right-wing, revisionist Zionist youth movement which wished to revise contemporary Zionism and return to Herzlian principles. The organisation was set up on the initiative of Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1923 and its main stronghold was certain segments of the Polish Jewish middle class. Until 1935 the Betar in Hungary functioned as the sports department of the Hungarian Zionist Association. In 1935 the HZA, following events abroad, excluded the Betar from the Association. Up to the territorial enlargement of Hungary with the reannexation of territories that had been annexed after the First World War, the members of the Betar numbered 200–300 individuals.

Certificates: permission to emigrate to Palestine granted by the authorities of the Palestinian British Mandate to the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency distributed the permissions according to the strength of the Zionist movement and the situation of the Jews in a given country.

Erez Yisrael ha-Ovedet (Worker Erez Israel): left-wing Zionist party coalition. The EIH was founded in Warsaw in 1931 by the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair, the Poale Zion and the Hechalutz parties. Its aim was to unify the forces of left-wing Zionism in order to win in the elections to the Zionist congresses. The parties involved distributed the votes for the EIH according to an agreement. In Hungary, all the votes for the EIH were given to the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair.

General Zionists (Klal Zionists; klal means ‘general’ in Hebrew): this movement was set up in 1907. People who accepted only the Basel Programme of the Zionists identified themselves with this orientation. After the 12th Zionist Congress more than 70 percent of the members of all the Zionist organisations declared themselves General Zionists, but their number had significantly decreased by 1931. The General Zionists had two factions. One was left-wing oriented and the other right-wing oriented. Until the Second World War the leadership of the Hungarian Zionist Association was comprised of General Zionists.

Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair (The Young Guard): one of the most influential Zionist–Marxist organisations. It was founded in Galicia in 1913 when various left-wing Zionist groups were unified under this name. The Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair developed a separate educational system and kibbutz organisation. There were two Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair centres in the 1930s: one in Warsaw and the other in Merkhavyah (Palestine).

Hungarian Zionist Association: a nation-wide federative Zionist organisation in Hungary. The Ministry of Home Affairs accepted the Statutes of the HZA in 1927. The Association functioned as an umbrella organisation. The Association of Budapest was the most important sub-organisation of the HZA. Like all organisations, the HZA also had departments, a board, a president, and so on. Officially recorded Zionists numbered about four–five thousand in the 1930s.

Jewish Agency (Sochnut): founded in 1929, it had both Zionist and non-Zionist representatives. The setting up of the Sochnut was based on the Mandate of Palestine (4th article) which decided to set up ‘an appropriate Jewish Agency’. The establishment of the Sochnut was decided at the 16th Zionist congress in Zürich. The aim of the Agency was to mobilise the Jews to emigrate to Palestine. The Sochnut had various departments, such as Organisation, Aliya, which later became the ministries of the Israeli government.

Keren Hayesod: Zionist monetary fund established at the Zionist Congress in London in 1920. Its goal was to support emigration to Palestine and the establishment of agricultural settlements. It functioned in Hungary as a department of the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews.

Keren Kayemet le-Israel: Zionist monetary fund. Its establishment was proposed by leading Zionists at the 1st Zionist Congress and it was officially recorded in 1907. Its aim was to acquire as much land in Palestine as possible. Later it supported greater settlement projects. Until 1945 it functioned as a department of the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews.

Mizrachi (Merkaz Ruchani = Spiritual Centre): religious Zionist organisation founded in Vilna in 1902. It emphasised the national–ethnic importance of the Jewish tradition, namely the religious commandments which made reference to Erez Yisrael/Palestine. In Hungary, one-third of the Zionists were members of the Mizrachi movement.

Palestine Office(s): offices representing the Jewish Agency outside Palestine. They organised and arranged everything pertaining to emigration to Palestine (visas, passports, and so on). In the leadership of the Palestine
Office in Hungary the various Zionist parties were represented according to their proportion and the balance of forces.

**Poale Zion**: leftist Zionist party founded in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. The Poale Zion opposed the policy followed by the Bund and the Jewish members of the Russian Social Democratic Party, concentrating its efforts only on Palestine. Poale Zion had regional groups in other Central and Eastern European countries and in the US as well.

**Shekel**: symbolic Zionist currency. The name comes from the Bible. It functioned as a membership fee and ‘identity card’ for the Zionists. All Zionists were obliged to buy shekels and the representation of a given party at the Zionist congresses depended on the amount of shekels it sold.

**Zionist Congresses**: Official body of the World Zionist Organisation from 1897. Between 1897 and 1899 congresses were held each year, and from then on every other year. Zionists from all over the world participated in these congresses where general policies were determined. The leadership of the Zionist movement was also elected at these congresses.

**Zionist parties**: they were established in the first decade of organised Zionism and they started party lists in the areas where shekels were sold. There were parties of various shades: religious, Marxist, liberal, and right-wing. In Hungary the moderate Zionists were the dominant force, but from the end of the 1920s more and more other parties were established.

**Zionist World Movement**: the official organisation of the Zionist movement established in Basel in 1897. The Zionist World Movement had (and has) a General Assembly which functioned as the representative of the Zionist Congress in between two congresses and an Executive which executed the resolutions of the congresses. The Zionist World Movement was fragmented along ideological and party lines.
Footnotes

3. The old claim of the Zionists was to raise the numbers of the saving-boxes. The information given by Nachum Goldmann was not accurate because the Ministry of Home Affairs had already allowed the use of 6,000 money-boxes. (122.168/1930 B.M. sz.r.).
4. There were general decrees and special orders for the collections in Hungary. The general decrees contained the conditions of the collections and the special orders contained the names of the participants. The last permission of the Pro-Palestine Association was the decree of n.199.919/1934 B.M., which was the prolongation of the decree of n.197.013 B.M. from 1932 and 1934.
6. We find the order of Boór on the reverse side of the report. Number: 6856/1935./VII. res. (Strictly confidential!).
10. We disclose the *ken* places and Hakhsharot of the left-wing Zionist groups. Hakhsharot in Budapest: *Dror*: 46 Bajza street, floor 2, door 37. Boys and girls were living together. Supposedly 70 people went to Palestine. *Stam Chalutz*: 11 Barcsay street, floor 2, door 20. The *hakhsharah* consists of 20 people. They had a *hakhsharah* in Hácsz in the summer of 1935. *Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair*: 18 Kálvária square, floor 1, door 3. 15 people are living together: men and women in the same flat. Cp. OL. K 149 n.651.f.4/336.sz.
11. Cp. OL K 149 1936-7-8486. Nachum Goldmann was born in 1895 in Lithuania, but he moved with his parents to Germany. During the First World War he became the head of the Jewish Section of the German Foreign Ministry. He was appointed to the League of Nations as the delegate of the Jewish Agency for Palestine from 1935. From the 1920s, he was the editor of the Hebrew Encyclopaedia written in German. During the Second World War he worked in the US and from 1951 to 1977 he was the leader of the World Jewish Congress. From 1956 to 1968 he served as the leader of the World Zionist Congress. After 1968 he went into exile to Switzerland for moral and personal reasons. He died in 1982.
12. Cp. OL K 149 1936-7-8486.
13. Cp. Black Paper (an official publication about political criminals, which was published in the Horthy era).
14. ‘Letter written by Dr Béla Fényes (Palestine Office, Budapest) to the Aliya Department of the Jewish Agency’. One of the two *hakhsharot* was a Ha-Shomer Ha-Zaair, while the other pertained to the Stam Chalutz movement. Cp. CZA S 6 1918. 7 December 1936.
15. Cp. CZA S 5 2281.
18. Excerpts from Kozma’s reply: ‘As regards the problem of the Zionist Association, as my colleague said, it is functioning with the permission of the Ministry of Home Affairs. And I do not see any need to change the permission, because those organisations which were involved in communist agitation were cover-organisations. Their connection to the Zionist Association was in name only . . .’, ‘Országyügyés Képviselőháznak Naplója’, pp. 450–55.
20. ‘The Hungarian Royal Minister of Home Affairs’. Strictly confidential. (8299/1936/ VII.res.). To all the Captaincies and Deputies of the Hungarian Royal Police [= HRP]. To the Division of Political Issues of the HRP and to the Investigative Headquarters of HRP. Cp. OL K 149-1936-7-8299.
71. VII(res.). To all the Captaincies and Deputies of the Hungarian Royal Police. To the Division of Political Issues of the HRP and to the Investigative Headquarters of HRP. Cp. OL K 149-1936-7-8299.
23. ‘Letter written by Sándor Hunwald to the Department of Aliya’. Moreover, he declares they have four haksharot with 88 people. Cp. CZA S 5 1918.
24. ‘The Minister of Home Affairs to the Chief-Captains of the HRP in Budapest and in the provinces, and to all the Sub-Prefects’ (Number: 9152/1936/VII.res.). Subject: Taking people under police surveillance. Budapest, 30 July 1936. Cp. OL K 149, pack 176, item 7, 1936-7-9152.
25. ‘Letter written by the Organisational Department to Nachum Goldmann’ (Geneve), 5 July 1936. Cp. CZA Z 4 10345/1.
26. Dr József Patai, ‘Let’s work for Palestine!’. The Zionist personalities were Menachem Ussischkin, the President of Keren Kayemet and Arthur Hantke, the President of Keren Hayesod. Cp. Egyenlőség 7 January 1937, p.6.
29. We have another piece of information: ‘Letter written by Dr Béla Fényes (Palestine Office in Hungary) to the Aliya Department of the Jewish Agency’. Béla Fényes alleges the disclosure of all the Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair Haksharot to the right-wing press campaign. Cp. CZA S 6 1918, 7 December 1936.
30. ‘Letter written by the Palestine Office (Budapest) to the Aliya Department of the Jewish Agency’. The letter of He-Halutz is attributed to Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair. 16 December 1936. Cp. CZA S 6 1918.
32. Stam Chalutz was the Zionist movement of those people, who did not get a Zionist education before the age of 18.
33. The HZA referred to the problems of the movement: ‘As the local authorities cause problems, we cannot fill the general requirements of the Zionist congresses, so we should alter these requirements if they contradict the local decrees’. ‘Letter written by Dr Frigyes Fried to the Organisation Department of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation’, 14 December 1936. Cp. CZA S 6 1918.
35. ‘Letter written by the Pro-Palestine Association of Hungarian Jews to the Division of State Security’ [Államrendészeti Osztály], 9 December 1936. Cca. 500 Pengos were seized by the police. Cp. OL K 149 1937-7-4113.
36. Dr Frigyes Fried gave a report on this event in a letter which was written on 14 December 1936 to the Organisation Department. According to the information given by Dr Fried the Pro-Palestine Association had intervened. The problem was whether the Statutes of the Association may permit donations from its members for Palestinian causes or not. If the Statutes permitted such donations, the procedure of the police was not legitimate. Cp. S 6 1918.
38. ‘Letter written by Dr Lajos Jordán (member of the leadership of the Palestine Committee) to the Immigration Department of the Zionist Association’. The date of the letter is unknown. Cp. CZA S 6 1918.
39. The economic fairness of the Palestine Office was also questioned by the HZA. ‘Letter written by Dr Lajos Jordán (Head of the Executive of the Palestine Committee) to the Immigration Department of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation’, December 1936. Cp. CZA S6 1918.
40. ‘Letter written by Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair to the Organisation Department of Sochnut’, 23 December 1936. They referred to the fact that they had conducted negotiations with Yitzhak Grunbaum, Nachum Goldmann and Berl Locker but had failed to reach an agreement. Cp. CZA S 5 2281(315/97). The next letter was written by the Warsaw centre of Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair to the Aliya Department. They asked for 10 certificates. Cp. CZA S 6 1918. 23 December 1936.
41. Ármin Beregi, the ex-President of the Palestine Office who had lived in Palestine, complained of the disadvantages caused by the police. Tel-Aviv, 23 December 1936. Cp. CZA S 6 1918.
44. ‘Letter written by Dr Nachum Goldmann (Geneve) to Dr Leo Lauterbach (Jerusalem)’. Goldmann writes that he will not travel to Hungary before February, 27 December 1936. Cp. CZA S 6 1918.


50. ‘Letter written by Werner Senator to the HZA’, 3 February 1937. Werner Senator was one of the members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency. Cp. ZA Z 4 10345/1.

52. ‘Letter written by Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair (Warsaw) to the Organisation Department (Jerusalem)’, 22 February 1937. Cp. ZA S 5 2281.


54. According to the letter written by the members of Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair to the Organisation Department Iczkovits travelled again to Hungary in February 1937. 2 February 1937. Cp. ZA S 5 2281.

55. ‘Pro Domō’ notes of Pál Balla’, 12 February 1937. Balla was one of the secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cp. OL K 63 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Department) pack 412, 1939–43, Budapest.


57. 2 February 1938. Cp. OL K 63-1939–43.


59. ‘Selig Brodetsky to Nachum Goldmann (Geneve)’, 17 March 1937. Brodetsky writes that he visited the secretary of the embassy and gave him a memorandum. Cp. ZA Z 4 10345/1. However, Szilárd Masirevich, Ambassador of Hungary, declares in a letter written on 31 March that Lourie was here recently. Probably there were two visits. Cp. OL K 63 pack 412, 1939–43 (1147/1937).


62. According to Chaim Barlas there are 72 people in the various haksharot. Cp. ZA S 6 1920.

63. There were youths from Sátoraljaújhely, Kisvárda, Miskolc and Huszt among the members of the detainees. Cp. Új Magyarság, 6 November 1937, p. 7. The police transported the countryside men and women of the haksharot to the country. Cp. Pesti Hirlap, 6 November, 1937, p. 8.

64. According to Esti Kurir (7 November 1937, p. 7) there was a protest against the members of haksharot by the antisemitic students of some universities on 7 November. Their slogan was ‘Down with the members of the haksharot!’. Új Kelet (11 November, 1937, p. 8) also gave a report on the protest.


70. Political Investigative Division of the Hungarian Royal Police to the Minister of Home Affairs (833/5.-1937.pol.rend.res.). 23 December 1937. The investigations were in progress according to the 127/3 and subn.5. report of the Captaincy of Miskolc of HRP. Cp. OL K 149 1937-7-14273.

71. The general-secretary of the HZA, Dr Miklós Buk laid the leaflet before Aladár Szegedy-Maszák, secretary of the Embassy and member of the Political Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 February 1937. Cp. OL K 63 412.cs. 1939–43.

72. There were vehement articles which referred to the visit of Nachum Goldmann in Bne Betar, the organ of Hungarian right-wing Zionists: ‘A peches külügyminiszterjelölt’ [The unlucky candidate for the post of minister of foreign affairs] and ‘Tanulmány Út’ [Study tour]. Cp. Bne Betar, January 1938, p. 15 and March 1938, p. 31.

76. ‘Letter written by Erez Yisrael ha-Ovedet (Signed by Béla Székely and Sándor Hunwald) to the Executive of Zionist Organisation’, 3 February 1938. Cp. CZA S 5 513.
77. Cp. OL K63-1939–43.
78. Nevertheless they would accept some police measures: “The Hungarian Zionist Association will readily accept in the future, just as it did in the past, all modes of police surveillance of the hakhsharot that will protect the members of these hakhsharot and the Hungarian Zionist Association from harassment.” The writers of this text may have thought of the old method of registering the places and the members of hakhsharot.
81. ‘A Jewish Agency for Palestine memoranduma a Magyar Nemzeti Bankhoz a Magyar–palesztinai transzfer-egyezmény tárgyában’ [Memorandum of the Jewish Agency for Palestine concerning the Hungarian–Palestinian transfer-agreement], Budapest, 1939.
82. ‘These organisations would deal with all the affairs of Jewish emigrants and would-be emigrants, such as their selection, the appropriate mixture (sic! A.N.) of poor and rich emigrants, etc. The planned transfer-agreement between us and the Royal Government of Hungary would determine what should be the proportion of the distribution of foreign currency for the emigration of poor and rich emigrants and how much to allocate to the transfer of the money of the Zionist funds and organisations.’ 4th point, ‘A Jewish Agency for Palestine memoranduma a Magyar Nemzeti Bankhoz’.
83. ‘A few days previously the leadership of the Association had arranged that the deputy of the Jewish Agency would go to Budapest in order to conduct and, as soon as possible, finish the transfer-negotiations.’ Supposedly the transfer-agreement would be one of the themes of the negotiations of Gyula Miklós in London. ‘A Magyar Cionista Szövetség közli’ [News of the HZA], Budapest, 9 January 1939. Cp. the Archives of Hajdú-Bihar County [= HBL] X.301. 9.d./168.
84. ‘A Magyar Cionista Szövetség közli’ [News of the HZA], Budapest, 15 April 1939. Cp. HBL.
85. In 1939 the call for the elections of the HZA reported that the transfer-negotiations were still in progress. ‘HZA call for the elections of the 21st Zionist Congress’. The date is illegible. Cp. HBL.
88. Feilchenfeld wished to use 100,000 ‘Joint’ dollars for the cause of emigration: the 20 certificates of businessmen would be assured in this way. The problem was that in the case of the workers’ and students’ certificates, the American Joint Distribution Committee would have had to prove the existence of 10,000 dollars, therefore the Joint would give for this cause another 10,000 dollars, so the total would be 110,000 dollars. ‘A Magyar Nemzeti Bank Tekintetes Igazgatóságának’, Budapest, 23 July 1939. Cp. MZSL I/5.2.