INTRODUCTION

Anyone who deals even marginally with anti-Americanism has to be struck by its closeness to the prominent topic of antisemitism. I have always viewed the two as close relatives or (to put the point even more figuratively) as first cousins. But my research has convinced me that the relationship between these two phenomena is even closer than is the case among cousins. André Glucksmann’s characterization of the two as “twin brothers” seems more apt. Glucksmann, like myself, sees contemporary antisemitism as, among other things, a consequence of as well as a necessary corollary to anti-Americanism and both as essential ingredients of a Europe-wide hatred with a pedigreed history.2 He writes about the current situation in France and Europe: “One plus two plus three: From the extreme Right to the extreme Left, everyone in French politics — simple activists, members of parliament, trade unionists, cabinet ministers, and the head of state in uniform — is raving against the intervention in Iraq; Bush equals Sharon equals

1 Although the term “antisemitism,” just like “America,” ought to be unmistakably clear to all concerned, the former requires a brief explanatory footnote, since there are always people who, for whatever reason, attempt to relativize and alter the concept. Ever since Wilhelm Marx (in his 1879 anti-Jewish pamphlet The Victory of Jewry over Germanism) introduced the expression “antisemitism” into the public sphere and common usage of every European country as a negative attitude toward the collectivity of “Jews” and everything Jewish, this precisely what this generic term has meant: a general negative prejudice against Jews that can coagulate into an ideological explanation of the world attributing all kinds of social phenomena to the impact of Jews. In the course of the Jewish-Arab conflict during the 20th century, Arabs and (some) Europeans developed the so-called ideology that their attitude toward Jews could not possibly be antisemitic, since Arabs themselves are “Semites.” Quite apart from the fact that Arabs can also be anti-Arabic and, according to this logic, also “anti-Semitic” (since prejudices are spiritual, intellectual, and emotional constructs not tied to the birthplace or “peoplehood” of anyone holding them) — this argument only serves as an exculpation and disguise of modern Arab hatred of Jews. In discussing the phenomenon that is generally characterized as antisemitism, it ought to be clear that this has nothing to do with any kind of “Semite” linguistic regions or “ethnic groups,” but with modern hostility to Jews. Some authors — in order to evade this pseudo-problem — have gone over to using the term “anti-Semitism” (in place of “antisemitism”). I find this superficial and politically unacceptable. For a precise definition of terms like antisemitism, the German “Judenfeindlichkeit” (hostility or animosity toward Jews) and Judeopobia in current social science discussions, and for more on the debate about new symbolic forms of these phenomena, cf. L. Reissmann, Demokratie und Jüdisch. Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Wiesbaden, 2004), pp. 71—95.

2 Glucksmann develops this link in his impressive analysis of the existence of hatred. See A. Glucksmann, Le Discours de la haine (Paris, 2004).
murderers' is the chant from the street. 'Sharon equals Bush equals disregard for international law' is the pronouncement from the salons. The rise of antisemitism is really not a result of the Intifada, but rather a twin brother of the wave of anti-Americanism that has slashed up onto the coasts of Europe since September 11 and flooded the continent since the Iraq war.

A central theme of this article is to discern one of the main characteristics of antisemitism in Europe today: its status as an epiphenomenon of anti-Americanism. This feature is, I believe, perhaps the most important component of the "new" antisemitism. It is a recent addition to stereotypes reviving both traditional antisemitism and the specific element of that decades-old hostility to Israel directed against the existence of an entire country in its capacity as "collective Jew."

European antisemitism, of course, predates anti-Americanism by more than a thousand years. And, of course, there are major differences between these two phenomena at every conceivable level. The most important such difference is the fact that European antisemitism motivated the brutal, systematic murder of millions of innocent people and humiliated, ostracized, persecuted, and oppressed peoples for centuries. In contrast, anti-Americanism, even in its most aggressive, most hate-filled form − with the few exceptions of individual terrorist attacks (and leaving aside conflicts between states in various wars, which I am not including here) − hardly ever led to a loss of human life and was largely restricted to property damage in the form of "America Houses" destroyed or American flags burned for symbolic reasons. This is an all-or-nothing difference, which places these two European phenomena in completely different explanatory realms and indicates that there is a fundamentally different quality, indeed a principally different status, to anti-Americanism and antisemitism.

But this does not mean that the two cannot be analyzed and discussed together, especially since they have gone hand in hand with each other since at least the early 19th century. Let us put it this way: one can easily write about European antisemitism without ever talking about anti-Americanism. The converse, I maintain, is impossible.

ANTISEMITISM − A EUROPEAN PHENOMENON

Just as with anti-Americanism, when it comes to antisemitism I am firmly convinced that, in principle, there are (or were) no country-specific differences within Europe, even if, from time to time, different countries produce specific intensities and expressions that motivate different forms of social violence and are also partly manifested in different functions. European antisemitism's conceptual structures, its symbolic language and its essential content have been remarkably similar in Europe both diachronically and synchronically. To be sure, countries − even regions, social groups and cultures within countries − differed in terms of their motivations for and implementations of antisemitism. To give one current example, German postwar antisemitism has always been associated with a special defense mechanism against a sense of guilt; i.e. prejudices and irritations have been expressed against Jews, among other reasons, because Jews embody a constant reminder of post-national crimes and therefore of a feeling of "national shame" that can impede Germans' unbroken identification with their nation. This phenomenon does not alter the content of German antisemitism one bit and renders it identical to Romanian or French antisemitism. However, its motives are obviously specific to Germany − to be more precise still, to the former West Germany. One might mention other such country-specific nuances in the manifestations of antisemitism across Europe even though conceptually, emotionally, historically, structurally, and content-wise antisemitism was and is a wholly pan-European construct.

It is precisely for this reason that the Nazis were so successful in carrying out the extermination of the Jews, although the murder of European Jews emigrated from Germany and has to be seen against the background of a specific German constellation, and of Germany's prewar political culture and hegemonic self-image as a "blood nation." In addition, of course, without the Wehrmacht and the entire apparatus of a modern industrial state, there could never have been such a quick and efficient effort at sorting out millions of people from their societies across an entire continent, deporting them to death camps, and then − often within a matter of hours − killing them with industrial precision and logic. But the project of exterminating the Jews was basically just the logical apex, the compelling goal, of a brutal European antisemitism that had lasted at least a millennium. The Shoah was, at the same time, the culmination of a European process of repeatedly mobilized and institutionalized degradation, exclusion, and persecution of Jews that had been the common property of everyday culture on the continent since 1010 at the latest. If antisemitism had been exclusively − or even just primarily − a German phenomenon rather than the established common property of Europe that it was, the Nazis would never have received so much support for their genocide from the populations of those countries occupied by them or allied with them.

ANTISEMITISM − A EUROPEAN PHENOMENON

Just as with anti-Americanism, when it comes to antisemitism I am firmly convinced that, in principle, there are (or were) no country-specific differences within Europe, even if, from time to time, different countries produce specific intensities and expressions that motivate different forms of social violence and are also partly manifested in different functions. European antisemitism's conceptual structures, its symbolic language and its essential content have been remarkably similar in Europe both diachronically and synchronically. To be sure, countries − even regions, social


4 I have been impressed by the research of Richard Landes, who dates the start of acute and ultimately lethal European antisemitism to the winter of 1010. As a response to the destruction of the Holy Sepulcher by the Muslim Caliph al-Hakim, antisemitism brought the first organized massacres of Jews to Europe (especially to France). This systematically politically motivated mass murder occurred in connection with new efforts at state-building in Christian and with mobilization measures helping to raise armies in order to fight the Muslims in the Holy Land. There had, of course, also been violent actions against Jews herebefore, though they had not (according to Landes) gone beyond the usual, vendetta-like acts of revenge that characterize rival communities and cultures living side by side all over the world. See R. Landes, 'What Happens When Jesus Doesn't Come: Jewish and Christian Relations in Apocalyptic Time' (unpublished manuscript, Center for Millennium Studies, Boston University, 2000, p. 117).

Obviously, there were different degrees of cooperation and participation, as well as resistance, something Hannah Arendt had already described in detail in her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem.* Just as with anti-Americanism, there have always been country- and time-specific variations in the manifestation of European antisemitism, which sometimes appeared stronger in Great Britain, and then in France; initially vehement in Spain, later in Poland, Russia, Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Germany. At first its foundation was chiefly religious and economic; then, starting with the Spanish Inquisition, clearly racist components were added. (The political dimension of antisemitism was ubiquitous.) There is not a single country in Europe — not Ireland in the west, not the Scandinavian countries in the north, Italy and Greece in the south, not the Ukraine and Russia in the east — in which antisemitism has not, over the centuries, assumed a significant role in a very concrete manner in the everyday life of its citizens. Regardless of whether the hegemonic religion has been Roman Catholic, Protestant, or industrial, or whether politics was shaped by a feudal aristocracy or a parliamentary oriented bourgeois, they all knew and used antisemitism. Of course, there were enormous differences between the lethal violence of pogroms in Czarist Russia and the snobbish ostracism of London clubs that refused to accept Jewish members. But these were differences in the manifestation and exercise of this prejudice and hatred, not in its conception and essence.

Already in the 17th century, well before the establishment of the American Republic, the divergent paths that religion took in these two settings — and that still differentiate the United States from Europe perhaps more than any other single social, political or cultural factor — also had a major bearing on the development of antisemitism in these two respective societies, as well as on its role in their relationship with each other. Whereas Europe’s religious life continued to be ruled by a deeply anti-semitic Catholic Church in the continent’s geographic center and its south, a state-oriented, equally anti-semitic Protestantism mainly of the Lutheran variety in its north (though one would need to differentiate the vehemence of antisemitism practiced by German Lutheranism as opposed to its much milder Danish and Swedish variants), and a structurally very similar Orthodoxy in its eastern regions, America’s religious life featured two characteristics that Europe never had, and the ramifications of which Europeans fail to comprehend to this day: first, religion in America was completely decentralized and local. The search for political freedom in America was important, and it was inextricably tied to the search for religious freedom, thus giving religion and religious vocabulary in American politics a completely different meaning than in Europe. Second, it featured a Protestantism that professed its great admiration for the Jews, indeed, one that saw itself as a close relative of the Jews, whose ancient writings and customs it extolled. This, after all, was the world in which biblical names such as Elijah, Jeremiah, Jedediah, Josiah became commonplace. The point is that from well before the founding of the American Republic the framework wherein people related to Jews and Judaism was profoundly different in America from what it had been in Europe. Be it Arthur Herzberg, Seymour Martin Lipset, the late Ben Halpern or Marshall Sklare, and most of all the late Irving Howe, all experts trying to explain the experience of Jews in the United States via an explicit comparison to its counterpart in Europe come to one overarching conclusion: put succinctly, in the words of Ben Halpern, "America is different." Despite the uninterrupted — sometimes vehement — existence of antisemitism throughout the history of the United States, very few Jewish individuals in America were ever murdered solely because they were Jews and no mass killings of Jews at the hands of their non-Jewish neighbors ever occurred in America, which few, if any, European country can claim in their history. Indeed, there is simply no contest between America and Europe as to where the Jews met with greater acceptance, security, even appreciation. "To find evidence of serious antisemitism in America for much of the time Jews have lived here, you need to put on knee pads and go searching in the nooks and crannies of history," wrote David Klinghoffer in reviewing two books on antisemitism in America. 8

It was not until the late 19th century — coinciding precisely and not by accident with the rise of what became known as "political antisemitism" — that antisemitism began to accompany European anti-Americanism in a systematic and regular manner, that these two the by the turn of the century thought that they remain today. It was the fear and critique of capitalist modernity that brought these two resentments together. America and the Jews were seen as paragons of modernity: money-driven, profit-hungry, urban, universalistic, individualistic, mobile, rootless, and hostile to established traditions and values. That it was the fear of modernity linking Jews and Americans at this juncture of European resentment is best borne out by the fact that Jewish immigration to the United States had not yet reached the large numbers that it would twenty years later, and that American power in the world was still rather ephemeral. In other words, it was not the actually existing United States and its Jews that were feared and

---

6 On this important difference between the United States and Europe, see the work by Ronald Inglehart and his World Value Survey at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

7 Of course there was the infamous lynching of Leo Frank in August 1915 in Marietta, Georgia, when an antisemitic mob took matters into their hands by abducting Leo Frank from his jail cell and hanging him from an oak tree. And there was the stabbing of Yankel Rosenbaum in August 1991 in the Borough Park section of Brooklyn when an angry mob attacked Jews indiscriminately. In both cases claims of "kill the Jew" filled the air. But the mere fact that I can list individual cases with names in America’s 250-year history proves my point: These were exceptional cases. It would be well-nigh impossible to do so listing the byr of antisemitic atrocities in most European countries, East and West.


disdained, but the combination of Judaism and Americanism as concepts and social trends. After World War I, the Jews as rulers of America became pronounced. It was at this juncture that the notions of Jewish Wall Street, Jewish Hollywood, Jewish Jazz, in other words of a thoroughly "Jewified" America became commonplace. It was at this time that all the forerunners for current codes such as the "East Coast" were permanently established. From then on, Jews and America became inextricably intertwined, not only as representatives of modernity but also as holders of actual power. America was powerful and the Jews in it even more so. One of the staples of European antisemitism has always been to impute much more power to Jews than they actually have. Moreover, what makes this putative power even more potent is that it is believed to be clandestine and cliquish. With America's strength massively growing after World War I, power as a unifying notion between Jews and America became more pronounced and also lasting. The hostile perception of this alleged link became absolutely integral to National Socialism.

Things appeared to change after the end of World War II, the Holocaust, the establishment of Israel and the Cold War. American power, though still massively resented, became a much needed protector against the Soviet Union, its allies and Communism. Probably for the first time in over 1,000 years, the Holocaust rendered overt antisemitism socially unacceptable among Europe's elites. And Jews for the very first time in nearly two thousand years actually attained real power by dint of running a state. While these structural changes substantially altered the tone and the substance of the discourse about Jews and America in Europe, the two remained as intertwined as ever.

It is certainly no accident that a massive intervention into Europe by the United States - for the second time in the course of the last century - was required in order to make the pan-European language of antisemitism that had prevailed for a millennium unacceptable, both socially and politically. I am not arguing that the United States in any manner intervened in Europe to impede or alleviate European antisemitism. But the defeat of European fascism and German National Socialism by the Red Army and the Western powers dominated by the American armed forces led for the first time in Europe's history to political regimes and a hegemonic discourse in which antisemitism became basically illegitimate. This post-Holocaust concordance lasted almost exactly 50 years. In my view it is therefore no accident that antisemitism in some form or another is showing its face again in Europe just at the time when the United States is in the process of withdrawing politically and militarily from Europe. Again, the correlation between a gradual reappearance of certain antisemitic tropes in Europe's acceptable discourse and the disengagement of the United States from the continent might be tangential and epiphenomenal - just as was the pushing of antisemitism to Western Europe's discursive fringes with America's reentry into Europe following its destruction of fascism and National Socialism - but it most certainly is not spurious. I do not know if I would go as far as Jean-Claude Milner, who views the destruction of the Jews as a condition sine qua non for European unification and, by extension, European unification itself as the result of this singular crime. However, I have no doubt that antisemitism is assuming an important European function - as a pan-European discourse steeped in tradition and (above all) as an important ingredient in the European emotional repertoire - just at a time when the establishment of a new European proto- or quasi-state has become (and is likely to remain) a political reality in Europe's everyday life.10

ANTI-AMERICANISM AND ANTISEMITISM AS JOINT SYMBOLS

A visit to virtually any sizable public protest, conference, convention or gathering of any kind that featured anti-globalization as one of its themes focused virtually all its criticism and anger towards the United States. This indeed makes some sense since without any question the United States has been first among equals in this - partly - new stage of capitalism currently known as globalization. Two related phenomena in this milieu are striking: First, the virtual absence of any criticism, let alone venom that is reserved for the United States, for any of its major capitalist partners and competitors in this globalization process; second, the centrality of Israel as the protesters' co-target with the United States. Why is this so?

Why do Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Italy - the other members of the Group of Eight (G8), including Europe which enjoys an added seat at this club's table - or China and increasingly India, for that matter, not engender anywhere near the anger among the protesters that they have regularly exhibited towards the United States, and well before the advent of the Bush Administration? Why does the number of American flags burned and defaced at these occasions massively outnumber that of German, Italian, French or European flags for that matter which I - in my limited experience, to be sure - have never seen abused on any of these occasions? Concomitantly, what is the reason behind the burning and defiling of Israeli flags at these gatherings, to be sure in fewer numbers than the abuse of American flags, but still? Why is Israel such a prominent object of vilification at these meetings and demonstrations? Surely, countries like Germany, France, Canada - not to mention Europe - are much bigger players in the globalization process than is Israel. Why not protest against Saudi Arabia or any of the oil exporting countries that, arguably, play a much greater role in the global economy than does Israel?

When José Bové, a figurehead of the anti-globalization movement, visited Palestinians in Ramallah in the spring of 2002 - instead of traveling to Gujarat, where many more Muslims had been killed in pogroms by Hindu

mobs — the primary concern was not to demonstrate solidarity with an oppressed people. As the reincarnation of Pierre Pujade, the rightwing populist defender of small shopkeepers and other "modernization losers" in France of the 1950s, and the media-savvy representative of a global Pujadism, Bové's political disposition includes populist elements much closer to the convictions of French proto-fascism than to the Left (whether old or new). But none of these traditions is what drove Bové toward Ramallah and made him — like other opponents of globalization — a fierce enemy of Israel. Unlike Pujade's antisemitism, which was solely driven by the classic European Right's disdain for Jews as sole-less capitalists and brutal modernizers, Bové — at least to my knowledge — has never uttered anything that could even vaguely be termed antisemitic. So Bové's primary driving force in this matter was a deeply held antipathy towards Israel that emanates first and foremost from Israel's association with the United States, the world's evil globalizer and builder of McDonald's restaurants, one of which Bové bulldozed to the ground making him instantly a perennial favorite of the anti-globalization movement worldwide. It was decidedly not antisemitism in its conventional sense. It is Israel's power sui generis and its close relations with the United States that have rendered this one Near Eastern country into the co-villain for many globalization opponents. Yet, the West European Left's hatred for Israel did not remain self-contained. As I will argue, it has indeed been the anti-Zionism of the European Left, emanating from the Six-Day War of 1967, which has been the most prolific mediator between anti-Americanism and antisemitism.

There is no need here to delve more deeply into the emergence of the atrocious antisemitism that accompanied international meetings in Durban, Porto Alegre, and Davos. But the golden calf incident in Davos in January 2003 deserves brief mention, since it took on the tone that has become endemic in this milieu. This is best attested to by the need of some "attac" members in Austria and Germany to take an open stance against the pervasive antisemitism among its ranks at Davos and other places where the self-identified left-radical "attac" came uncomfortably close to the world of antisemitic tropes traditionally more common among the radical Right.11

At the Davos demonstration one demonstrator wore a Donald Rumsfeld mask over his head and a yellow six-pointed star with the label "Sheriff" on his chest, while his colleague, equipped with an Ariel Sharon mask, was swinging a club. These two characters were accompanied by one group of demonstrators disguised as "capitalist pigs" and another masquerading as "pig priests." The whole ensemble was dancing around the golden calf. "It is interesting," writes Marcus Hammerschmitt,

that an ensemble patched together from Carnival costumes (in part, with clear


"TWIN BROTHERS": EUROPEAN ANTISEMITISM AND ANTI-AMERICANISM

references to animals), the golden calf, a Star of David straight out of Nazi propaganda, and some masks of politicians is so brazenly used to mock the enemy, because the demonstrators assume that the message is already understood: Jewish Americans, or American Jews, worship money and gold and protect it with (animalistic) power, as only they know how. Simultaneously confusing and clear, both unfathomably deep and barbarically simple, as only authentic credentials of antisemitic mania can be, this procession denounces not only the abysmal stupidity of the demonstrators, but also the relationship (seldom clearer) between antisemitism and anti-Americanism: The idiots of Davos, who probably still see themselves as leftists, stick onto the person portraying Rumsfeld (in lovely conformity with Israeli government newspapers) the yellow star and inscribe the star with the word 'Sheriff' in order to dispel any last doubts about their ideology: For them, everything is one and the same, Americans are Jews, all Jews are like Sharon, a Star of David is the same as the star on a sheriff's badge, the golden calf is a Jewish calf, it's all the same. The onlookers, so they suspect, will certainly understand just what and who is intended; the main point is that the demon dancing around the idol has a signet.12

Lest the reader think that this overlap between overt anti-Americanism and antisemitism remains confined to what the British call the "loony left," here are two examples from the jewel of Europe's established social democracy. In his perfectly justified defense of the "German model," Franz Müntefering, chairman of the SPD, invoked an analogy of American hedge funds to "locust firms" that descend anonymously upon innocent, well-meaning German companies only to strip them of their assets and suck them dry. The SPD's "locust" campaign of April 2005 met with great popular support from the party's rank and file as well as the public at large. Müntefering's remarks were reinforced by an article in one of Germany's leading left-liberal magazines, Stern, in which seven of these "locust firms" were listed by name, some of them recognizably Jewish.13

Not to be outdone, Germany's most prominent labor union, IG Metall, featured an article on the same subject in the May 2005 issue of its magazine metall. Titled 'US-Firmen in Deutschland: Die Aussauber' (U.S. Companies in Germany: The [Blood]suckers), the cover depicts a mosquito donning an Uncle Sam-like hat with the American flag, gnawing ravenously under its huge nose, revealing a gold-filled tooth. It carries an American-style attacké case and is ready to descend upon the hapless German economy.

The article inside the magazine carries the title 'Die Plünderer sind da' (The Plunderers Are Here).

In the fifty-seven year history of metall, there has never been a more successful issue than this one featuring a barely disguised antisemitic cover and a thinly veiled antisemitic feature article. Although, in both the SPD's

locust campaign and IG Metall's mosquito follow-up, antisemitism had to be conveyed somewhat subtly, this was not the case with anti-Americanism.14 Whereas the caricatures' noses were only moderately crooked and the gold teeth only visible upon a close look, the symbols of the American flag and Uncle Sam-like top hats are unmistakable.

The fact that the new antisemitism based on hostility toward Israel goes hand in hand with anti-Americanism among major portions of the European Left is confirmed by the first report on antisemitism in 15 European countries published by the "European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia" (Europäische Stelle zur Beobachtung von Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit) in Vienna. In the analytical section of the report, before the data from the individual country studies are presented, the text entitled 'EUMC Report on Antisemitism' says unambiguously that the European Left's acute anti-Jewish attitude is partially concealing antisemitism in both tone and content, and that these emotions cannot be separated from the aversion to America.15

The supposedly close ties between the U.S. and Israel have contributed additional motives to growing antisemitic attitudes that one finds on the radical Left. The United States of America are also attacked more severely by the peace movement, the anti-globalization movement, and some developing countries. Elements of the radical Right join in and categorize the U.S. as an imperial power acting as Israel's protector. Thus, for example, many people in German-speaking countries especially use the term "East Coast" as a synonym for a supposedly total Jewish influence on the U.S. and its politics. Sympathizers with these extremes immediately understand the meaning of this word without additional explanations. They use it incessantly without running the danger of violating any antidiscrimination laws in a particular state. This example makes it clear how closely anti-Americanism and antisemitism are bound up with each other.16

The kind of antisemitism linked to the struggle against globalization represents a meeting point between the Right and Left of a kind that has not existed so openly since the heyday of National Bolshevism. The intensity of hatred against Israel has not least of all to do with a perception of Israel as America's proxy, as a de facto constituent of the United States – as well as vice versa. One can rail against Israel because it is powerful and belongs to an even greater power, the United States. But one can also rail against Israel because it happens to be a Jewish state. Before I delineate the key features in my view that render antisemitism, both in its old-fashioned and current manifestations, an integral part of anti-Americanism, a brief presentation of

17 Glucksman, 'Scharmostat Irland.' It is interesting how traditions can decisively influence both man and content. This quote comes from the just cited publication in the FAZ. On 24 July, 2004 the newspaper The Scotsman published the same article by Glucksman in an English translation. The Scottish paper used the word "people" instead of "country" (as reported by the Frankfurt paper). At issue was whether the world ought to risk a Third World War because of this "people/country." Furthermore, the FAZ translation talked about an 'important and reputable posting' for Bernard as ambassador in Algeria. For The Scotsman this was a "choice posting and a strategic one," which, given France's pro-Arab policy, indicates a clearly strategic move for an ambassador who openly utters these kinds of words about Israel. Even the English title of the article is much more telling than the German one. See A. Glucksman, 'Potent Ingredients Stirred into a Dangerous Anti-Semitic Cocktail,' The Scotsman, 24 July 2004.

perfectly formed, surely they wouldn't be hell-bent on making it bigger, come what may. In my experience Israel is shitty and little. What's more, the daily trauma it undergoes in defending its right to exist is the main thing that makes the place so shitty. 29 Not only is the three-time usage of this scatological term part of the author's disdain for Israel, but she continues her offensive (in both senses of the term) by dragging in the issue of antisemitism—just for good measure and to stake out her territory: 'I'm fed up with being called an anti-Semite. And the more fed up I get, the more antisemitic I sound.' Moreover, if the Jews continue to insist that everyone with a word to say against Israel is an anti-Semite, [they are] going to find one day that the world is once more divided neatly between anti-Semites and Jews. 20 The gauntlet is thrown. Everywhere in Europe the mantra is voiced that any criticism of Israel is being stymied by the Jews by calling it antisemitic. In an article addressing the growing tolerance and usage of antisemitic tropes in the British media under the guise of having the right to criticize Israel, and the concomitant inveighing against an alleged McCarthyism on the part of Jews and their minions against all who do so, Melanie Phillips examines the growth of antisemitism in Great Britain, which she attributes almost exclusively to the 'Sharon-hating Left' and not to the usual right-wing radicals. 21 Phillips describes how hostile and irritated the dominant discourse has become among the British intelligentsia when its members talk about the 'vastly exaggerated' warnings concerning a new antisemitism, and how the stigma of a 'new McCarthyism' is bestowed on this phenomenon (a witch hunt intended to muzzle criticism of Israel and brand anyone daring to criticize Israel as an anti-Semite). Phillips herself was then accused, along with other British Jews, of trying to exert control over the public debate about Israel and Jews in the U.K. Phillips describes British dons who organize boycotts against Israeli colleagues and universities but would never dream of undertaking similar measures against Kuwait (which expelled 350,000 Palestinians in 1991) or Jordan (which murdered tens of thousands of Palestinians) or Syria (which, a year after Phillips wrote her article, is still militarily occupied and politically controlled vast parts of Lebanon).

In an issue of The Independent, Marie Woolf wrote about some politicians' warnings against the growing virus of antisemitism in Great Britain. 22 Former minister Stephen Bryers had said that 'the dividing line between legitimate criticism of the Israeli government and demonizing and dehumanizing Jews has been crossed, and that there is a double standard' for judging Jews and Israel according to completely different criteria than all the other nations of the world. Woolf quotes Labour MP James Purnell, who was shocked at the caricatures and cartoons about Israel and Jews. He added astutely that the Holocaust had proved to be a good vaccination shot against the virus of antisemitism for 60 years, but that now—owing to the alliance policy of the radical Left, 'which has gotten involved with some extremely dubious elements'—it was losing its effectiveness. "During the antiwar demonstrations there were really frightening pictures of people who dressed up as suicide bombers and carried slogans equating the Star of David with the swastika. The apparent incorporation of these symbols by anti-war Leftists is absolutely incredible." The visibly shocked Purnell could have observed identical scenes at similar demonstrations in Berlin, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Athens, and many other European cities. They are the symbols of the current European peace movement, which has not, even for a single moment, really distanced itself from this imagery in an explicit and decisive way.

While such things are nothing new in the worlds of the extreme Right and Left in Europe and have been commonplace since the Six-Day War in June of 1967, they were not part of Europe's accepted political discourse until the 1990s. After all, many people have been rightfully upset with many a country's policies. But in virtually no case has that led to the questioning of the very worth of that country's existence. Slobodan Milošević's Yugoslavia became the bogeyman of Europe's publics (certainly after the slaughter of 7,500 Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica) but even this atrocity never led any British, French, German or Italian diplomats or journalists writing for these countries' papers of record to question the very right of Yugoslavia to exist as a country. Put crudely, it is becoming clearer by the day that the post-Auschwitz "closed season," is gradually coming to an end. The Jews are not "off limits" anymore in Europe. 23 This development reinforces my view that among all the prejudices that have beset European history, antisemitism has constantly assumed a place all its own. It is related to racism but yet different from it, furnishing a category all its own. And it is back with a vengeance in acceptable European discourse. "Der Ton macht die Musik," the tone makes the music. Seldom has this been clearer than in the case of contemporary Europe's irritation with Israel and Jews which can never be analyzed by itself but must be done so in a comparative context. To come back to my earlier example of Deborah Orr's using scatological language in a major British newspaper: Would she have used such terms to describe any other country in the world? Would her editors at The Independent have allowed such blatantly insulting terms in a report about

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 M. Phillips, "Anti-Semitism is on the increase and its roots are not in the Right but in the Sharon-hating Left," The Observer, 22 February 2004. It needs to be said that Melanie Phillips is a regular columnist for the conservative Daily Mail and provided this article in her capacity as a guest columnist for the Observer. In the article she identifies herself as Jewish.
23 For an amazingly stark demonstration of this, see The New Statesman's cover story called "The Kosher Connection." Also, Peter Beaumont's article in The Observer of Sunday, 24 February 2002. Peter Pulfer's reply was not published by this newspaper.
The new "uninhibitedness" – an awkward, arguably inadequate, English translation of the German original "Unbefangenheit" – surely also informs the German discourse, especially since the ascent of Gerhard Schröder's chancellorship and the governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, a group of people who by dint of their party affiliations and their age clearly could never come close to being associated with anything resembling the far Right, let alone its National Socialist variant. Just two weeks after the Bundestag election of September 27, 1998, in which those two parties barely defeated the conservative-liberal camp, the writer Martin Walser received the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade awarded annually at the Frankfurt Book Fair. It is customary for the recipient to give a speech in the city's Church of St. Paul.

Walser's address sparked the first "antisemitism dispute" in reunited Germany. It has not been resolved to this day and Walser continues to enjoy broad approval, most recently for his highly popular novel Tod eines Kritikers (Death of a Critic) in which he basically reiterates his positions from the 1998 dispute. The novel features a Jewish character who has the vilest traits of standard antisemitism – greedy, haughty, arrogant, oversexed, speaking in Polish-accented German – and is easily recognizable as a caricature of Marcel Reich-Ranicki, a well-known cultural critic of Polish Jewish origin.

Matthias N. Lorenz's book, Auschwitz drängt uns auf einen Fleck (Auschwitz pushes us onto one spot), presents convincing evidence that Walser's work, beginning with his early plays and novels, bears major elements of antisemitism dating back to his seemingly left-wing beginnings in the early 1960s. Among other things, Lorenz reveals that Walser – in a speech honoring the late Victor Klemperer (Professor of Romance literature in the former German Democratic Republic, an assimilated German Jew, married to a gentile woman, who survived the Nazi regime by staying in Berlin throughout the entire war and wrote about his life which – in its two-volume publication – became one of the most successful and well-

24 The original "Berlin antisemitism dispute" was triggered in 1879 when the historian Heinrich von Treitschke published an article accusing Germany's Jews of insufficient willingness to assimilate.

known testimonials of everyday life in National Socialist Berlin) – argued that the Holocaust would never have occurred had all German, and European, Jews assimilated as successfully as did Klemperer. It should be noted that had Klemperer – despite his total assimilation – not been married to a German Gentile woman, he, too, would have been sent to a death camp.

The fact that even Chancellor Schröder expressed solidarity with Walser during the 2002 election campaign indicates the reversal that has occurred since Germany was reunited. In his speech on October 11, 1998, Walser referred to the constant recalling of Germany's crimes in the Holocaust as a "permanent representation of our shame." He deplored an "instrumentalization of our shame for current purposes" and a "negative nationalism" that was disseminated by "intellectuals" and "opinion soldiers." These, he claimed, used the memory of the Holocaust by holding it "at moral gunpoint" as a "means of intimidation deployable at any time" in order to hurt "all Germans" – by thwarting the Germans' national pride and self-satisfaction. Walser, to be sure, was not the first to speak of the "Auschwitz cudgel," but he gave such notions his poetic blessing.

One key aspect of this "uninhibitedness," particularly pronounced in Germany, but certainly not exclusive to it in Europe, is the concerted effort by many players in society, and not only on the political Right, to break taboos that have become part of Germany's (and Europe's) post-Holocaust discourse and in the process free themselves from what the journalist Henryk Broder has termed "secondary antisemitism." "Secondary antisemitism" may be distinguished from ordinary antisemitism (with which, however, it shares most of the usual stereotypes) by dint of its defense mechanisms against guilt. The phenomenon of "secondary antisemitism" was well described for the first time by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their studies of the way postwar German society dealt with the Shoah. Because of the psychological mechanisms involved, Adorno and Horkheimer named this syndrome somewhat cumbrously but all the more precisely "Schuldabwehrentantisemitismus" which best translates into "guilt defensiveness antisemitism." By constantly bringing up the truly warped and ill-willed analogy of the Israelis with the Nazis, Europeans absolve themselves from any remorse and shame and thus experience a sense of liberation. If the Israelis were anywhere close to the Nazis and their genocidal deeds, the Palestinians

28 This view of Auschwitz as instrumentalized extends beyond Germany, a recent ADL survey found 42 percent of Europeans saying the statement that 'Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust' is probably true.
29 For the text of Walser's speech, see 'Die Banalität des Guten,' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 October 1998.
30 On this point, see the study by Rensmann, Demokratie und Judenbild, p. 123 ff.
would have ceased to exist decades ago. Thus the Israelis—Nazis analogy is not intended to describe Israel’s deeply objectionable occupation policies. It is not meant to criticize Israel but to demonize it—to place it outside any discussion about actual politics. Since the terms “Nazi” and “racist” have become internationally synonymous with ultimate evil, they form concepts beyond any discussion. Case closed, one is a Nazi and a racist. Nothing further needs to be said. This analogy does not only exculpate Europe from its own troubled past under the Nazis, but it also hurts the intended target—the Israelis directly, the Jews indirectly—by equating it with the very perpetrators who almost wiped it off the earth in the most brutal genocide imaginable.

Most importantly, all of this needs to be viewed in a comparative context in terms of both tone and substance: as to the former, what is important here is that no other vaguely comparable conflict has attained anywhere near the shrillness and acuity as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nazifying Israel makes it possible to kill three birds with one stone: The first objective achieved is the delegitimization of Israel by associating it with the symbol of evil par excellence. Secondly, one can attack and humiliate the Jewish people by equating it with the perpetrators of the brutal genocide that nearly succeeded in exterminating the Jews completely. Finally, this malicious analogy between Israelis and Nazis frees Europeans of any remorse or shame for their history of a lethal antisemitism that lasted a solid millennium.

It is by dint of this left-liberal voice, not the Right’s old-style antisemitism, that 95 percent of Europeans view Israel as being the greatest threat to global peace, putting this country in first place ahead of countries such as Iran, North Korea, the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, in that order.31 China was mentioned by 30 percent, thus ranking it as number 13. Not surprisingly, Europeans had the best opinion of themselves, placing Europe as dead last in terms of representing any danger to world peace. Only 8 percent of the respondents listed the European Union or any of its members as threats to peace with the Germans having the self-confidence (or might it be a bit of selfish arrogance) to list themselves dead last at 2 percent. The respondents in the Netherlands were particularly critical of Israel, viewing it as a threat to peace by a whopping 74 percent. The equivalent figure in Germany was 65 percent. In another survey, some 35 percent of Europeans believe that the Israeli Defense Forces intentionally target Palestinian civilians.32 In the same poll, 39 percent agreed that “Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is similar to South Africa’s treatment of blacks during the apartheid regime.”33 And almost half of the European respondents felt that Israel was not an “open and democratic society.”34 (American attitudes toward Israel are markedly different and thus constitute some of the strongest manifestations of the solid divide in trans-Atlantic perceptions of the world.) Anybody following the European media’s tone in covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the second intifada in September 2000 will not be surprised by these results. Once again, the origins of this hegemonic tone in Europe’s acceptable discourse do not hail from the Right but from the Left. And the tone set by elites and opinion leaders, such as journalists, really matters in terms of framing the acceptable contours of mass opinion.35

CONCLUSION

The Israeli psychologist Zvi Rex once said that the Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz. He could have added that the same pertains to the Americans’ (and the Red Army’s) defeat of National Socialism as well. It is hard to swallow the fact that Germany did not attain its now vaunted democratic culture, pacifism, and sense of virtue on its own but by dint of foreign powers vanquishing Hitler’s dictatorship. And when both victors, in their very different ways, are perceived as clearly inferior to Germans culturally, politically, in terms of bravery, valor and perseverance of the troops to name just a few pertinent items—the defeat stings all the more and, on some level, never got accepted. Adding insult to injury, both the Americans and the Soviets remained strongly identified with Jews and Jewry in the minds of Germans. But this issue goes far beyond the Germans and pertains to all of Europe. Here is Max Horkheimer’s voice on this matter: “America, regardless of its motives, saved Europe from complete enslavement. The response today from everywhere, not only in Germany, has been widespread and profound hostility towards America. There has been a great deal of puzzling over the origin of this. Recentment, envy, but also the errors made by the American government and its citizens, all play a role. It is especially startling to notice that everywhere where one finds anti-Americanism, antisemitism flourishes. The general malaise caused by cultural decline seeks a scapegoat, and for the aforementioned reasons, it finds the Americans, and, in America itself, once again the Jews who supposedly rule America.”36 The surplus of enmity exhibited towards Israel by Europeans, the much greater coverage of Israel by the European media than any other conflict in the world, including those much closer to Europe, bespeaks a qualitative dimension to this sentiment and attitude that borders on an obsession that reaches way beyond the conventional

31 Flash Eurobarometer 151, European Commission, November 2003, p. 81.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
Paul B. Miller

The (Non) Bombing of Auschwitz: Perks and Perils in Counterfactual History

On April 6, 1994, just hours after a plane carrying Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down, ethnic Hutu militias initiated a meticulously planned assault on supporters of the Hutu-Tutsi peace process. Assisted by victim lists prepared in advance and radio broadcasts of the names, addresses, and license plate numbers of Tutsi and moderate Hutu, the killings quickly and deliberately escalated into an all-out extermination of Rwanda's Tutsi people. Genocide was taking place yet again in the 20th century.

The American government, however, was loath to call it that, since doing so, an internal Defense Department paper warned, could "commit [the government] to actually 'do something.'" Instead the United States joined other nations in evacuating its citizens, leaving Rwandan embassy staffers behind to be massacred. On April 10 the United Nations commander in Rwanda, Major General Romeo Dallaire, beseeched New York for more troops and a mandate to send his peacekeepers to intervene in the killings. The U.N., under pressure from the United States, then made the decision that sealed the Tutsi's fate: On April 21, amid press reports of some 100,000 already dead, it drastically cut the force size of its Rwandan aid mission.¹

The Rwandan genocide lasted 100 days and took some 800,000 lives, an ethnic slaughter of innocents unmatched in speed, organization, and thoroughness, except once: during the Hungarian deportations to Auschwitz-Birkenau in the spring-summer of 1944.

Exactly half a century before the highly predictable and, many have argued, preventable genocide in Rwanda,² and long before the phrase "never again" had parsed any well-meaning lips, President Roosevelt addressed the American people:

In one of the blackest crimes of all history...the wholesale systematic murder of the Jews of Europe goes on unabated every hour...[the Jews of Hungary] are now threatened with annihilation...³

---

² Ibid., pp. 329–89. See also, for example, P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York, 1998); R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York, 2005); L. McVern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (London, 2000)